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ABSTRACT 
 
 At the most elementary level, this honors thesis is concerned with political tension 
and its ability to procure political health. The study begins with a discussion in political 
theory, examining the contemporary theory of agonism, which accepts conflict as an 
inevitable fact of pluralist political society and defends it as necessary for the 
maintenance of democracy. The study identifies agonism’s origins in the ancient Greek 
agon, but also emphasizes that the first formal exposition of agonal political ideas comes 
in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy. It continues to work in the realm of theory, charting 
moments of appreciation of agonal ideas, as well as a few moments of opposition to these 
ideas, in modern Western political thought. In doing this, it highlights the point that 
agonism and its main tenets are not just contemporary, radical, political ideas, but are 
housed in, and relevant to, mainstream political thought. From here, the study moves into 
a more practical analysis of how agonism applies to government and politics in the 
United States of America. Ultimately, it asserts that an accommodation and appreciation 
of political conflict or tension is deeply embedded in the American polity, and that, as 
such, the American experiment in democracy is, more specifically, an experiment in 
agonistic democracy. The study concludes with a conversation on the current state of 
tension in the United States in the context of the polarized political climate. It suggests 
that, as a result of polarization, tension in the U.S. is shifting from being agonistic in 
nature, thereby securing vitality and longevity, to being antagonistic, which Machiavelli 
and Mouffe warn will lead a republic to decay. Finally, it addresses why such a shift may 
be occurring, and what steps might be taken to begin to reverse it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“This animating principle doesn’t mean  
that all Americans think alike.  
It means that we have a tradition of conflict.” 
-David Brooks, “What Moderation Means” 
 
This study will commence with a melancholy political fact – democratic forms of 
government will inevitably decay. This fact is communicated by a number of political 
thinkers, including Polybius in his cycle of constitutions, as well as Machiavelli. 
However, Machiavelli, among others, also observes that there is, in fact, an antidote to 
constitutional decay. This antidote is political tension. “Antidote” is a particularly fitting 
metaphor. As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, an antidote is “a medicine given 
to counteract the influence of poison, or an attack of disease.”1 In this vein, political 
tension can act as an antidote to constitutional decay, and can procure political health. 
The notion of political tension as an antidote to decay is not frequently acknowledged in 
everyday political rhetoric. Unity, rather than tension, is more often associated with 
political health. There is a tradition, however, that appreciates political tension as a means 
to political health; this study, at its most elementary level, is concerned with that 
tradition.  
The inspiration behind this thesis came after reading an “op-ed” by David Brooks, 
published in the New York Times in October of 2012. In the piece, entitled “What 
Moderation Means,” Brooks offers his own definition of moderation. According to 
Brooks, moderation does not entail “just finding the midpoint between two opposing 
                                                        
1“Antidote, n.” OED Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press, March 2015. Web.  
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poles and opportunistically planting yourself there.”2 Rather, in a liberal democracy, true 
moderates try “to preserve the tradition of conflict, keeping the opposing sides balanced.3  
Brooks goes on to say, “being moderate does not mean being tepid…The best moderates 
can smash partisan categories and be hard-charging in two directions simultaneously.”4 In 
this regard, the moderate’s accommodation of conflict produced a certain energy and 
stability. After reading this piece, I noted that Brooks’ moderate seemed to exemplify an 
appreciation of tension like that seen in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, albeit on 
smaller, individual scale. Moreover, Brooks’ moderate also reflected an idea that I had, 
for some reason, taken to be a fact – that tension, conflict, and paradox, are at the heart of 
United States politics.5  
 As a student of both political theory and United States government, I have an 
inclination to attempt to draw connections between abstract theories and modern day 
American6 politics.  It is in this vein that this study explores the contemporary theory of 
agonism, charts its origins, and traces moments of appreciation of, and opposition to, 
agonal ideas throughout modern political thought. Understanding others’ appreciation of 
tension in politics facilitates one’s ability to appreciate tension in their own political 
environment. As such, this study will eventually come to identify and appreciate conflict 
and tension’s place in the American polity. 
                                                        
2 Brooks, David. “What Moderation Means,” New York Times, 25 Oct. 2012. Web.  
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
5 Credit must go to Dr. Ann Serow of Kingswood Oxford School for highlighting the tensions and 
paradoxes of American politics during an AP Political Science course taken during the 2010-2011 
academic year and for including readings to this effect in her Lanahan Readings in the American Polity, 
which was referenced frequently during this project.  
6 Throughout this study “American” will refer to the United States of America. This usage is in no way 
meant to diminish other “American” nations, including those in South or Latin American, but is rather used 
for convenience (since there is no adjective form for United States) and to keep in line with much of the 
related literature, which is cited. 
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The study will be organized as follows – The first chapter will be dedicated to the 
contemporary theory of agonism. It will define agonism, highlight its central tenets, and 
explore some of the nuances of the agonal theories put forward by various thinkers. It 
will go on to contrast agonism with other contemporary theories of politics, and will 
conclude by identifying agonism’s origins in the Greek agon, its connection to Roman 
Stoicism, and its first formal exposition in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy. The 
following chapter will explore Machiavelli’s claim that the stability and longevity of the 
Roman republic was a product of the tension existing between the Senate and the people, 
after which it will continue to trace moments of appreciation of agonal ideas through 
modern Western political thought. It will then address a few moments of opposition to 
agonal ideas to emphasize that, while the principles of agonal theory are appreciated in 
the thought of some modern theorists, such an appreciation is not universal. The third and 
final chapter will then turn to discuss agonal theory in relation to the United States. It will 
argue that the way in which the American political system accommodates, 
institutionalizes, and appreciates tension reveals that American democracy is notably 
agonistic.  
  
  4 
CHAPTER I 
Agonism — an Overview 
 
“A well-functioning democracy calls  
for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions.” 
-Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox 
 
 This chapter will examine agonal theory. Its main undertaking will be defining 
agonism, explaining its central tenets, and analyzing how it can manifest in modern 
democracy. Following this, the chapter will briefly point out other theories of the political 
that agonism is offered in contrast to. Finally, this chapter will seek to identify agonism 
within broader political thought, emphasizing its Greek origins, its connection to Roman 
Stoicism, and disclosing that the first formal and comprehensive statement of agonal 
political ideas came from Machiavelli during the Italian Renaissance.  
 Agonism gets its root from the Greek word agon, which means conflict or strife,7 
but the theory itself has gained significance as a political theory over the last twenty 
years.8 The Encyclopedia of Political Theory simply introduces agonism as a theory that 
emphasizes the importance of conflict to politics. Mark Wenman, in his book Agonistic 
Democracy, describes agonism as having three primary elements –an understanding of 
pluralism as fundamental, a tragic view of the world that sees conflict as inevitable, and a 
belief that conflict can be politically beneficial.9 Another helpful description of agonism 
is provided in Chapter 6 of Andrew Schaap’s Law & Agonistic Politics, titled “Polemos 
and Agon,” where Adam Thomson outlines that agonism re-imagines the defining quality 
                                                        
7 Wenman, Mark, Agonistic Democracy Constituent Power in the Era of Globalisation; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 4 
8 Little, Adrian, Enduring Conflict Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy; Enduring Conflict 
Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy. London; Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, p. 73 
9 Wenman, 28 
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of democratic politics as its appreciation of tension, rather than its promotion of a notion 
of a public and common good. He states, 
Agonists aim to redefine the relationship between 
democracy and politics. They share with many other 
critical analyses on both left and right a sense that modern 
democracy is not living up to its name. What makes their 
position distinctive is that it calls for a revitalization of 
modern democratic culture not in terms of the articulation 
of public goods which exceed partisan interests, but 
through a celebration of the continuous conflict of those 
interests.10 
 
In light of these definitions, as well as those put forth in the work of Chantal Mouffe, 
Noel O’Sullivan, Andrew Schaap, and Adrian Little, most basically, agonism is a 
political theory that acknowledges and accepts conflict as an inevitable fact of pluralist 
society, and defends it as necessary for the maintenance of democracy, which is the 
political form that scholars associate with agonism since it permits and promotes 
pluralism. 
 In this context I am using a largely social definition of pluralism. Pluralism is 
derived from the Latin word plures, meaning “several” or “many.” And as defined in the 
Oxford English Dictionary, pluralism signifies “the existence or toleration of diversity 
of… groups within a society or state, of beliefs or attitudes within a body or institution, 
etc.”11 Therefore, as used here, pluralism will most basically denote the recognition or 
toleration of unique, distinguishable parts, all of which exist within a political structure or 
society.  
 
                                                        
10 Thomson, Adam. “Polemos and Agon,” Law and Agonistic Politics. Ed. Andrew Schaap. Abingdon, 
UK: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2009; ProQuest ebrary, p. 107 
11 “Pluralism, n.” OED Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 
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 Returning to our examination of agonism, a deeper inspection of agonal thought 
allows for various strands of agonism to be identified. The Encyclopedia of Political 
Theory, in its page-long entry on agonism, distinguishes between descriptive agonism, 
which admits conflict as necessary to politics, and normative agonism, which holds that 
conflict has positive value and should be fostered and maintained in political systems. 
And then, having made this distinction, it admits that often the two are combined.12 
Admittedly, I struggle to appreciate any significant difference between descriptive and 
normative forms of agonism. Of the agonist perspectives I have been exposed to, conflict 
is regarded as inevitable and its maintenance has been deemed, at the very least, far 
preferable to its eradication, if not generally beneficial. Any distinction between what is 
politically necessary and politically positive does not seem to be especially substantial, 
therefore blurring the lines of descriptive and normative.  
For instance, The Encyclopedia associates two of the foremost agonal theorists 
with these two “types” of agonism – William Connolly with descriptive agonism, and 
Chantal Mouffe with normative. Connolly’s agonism, it states, comes out of his 
criticisms of 1950’s and 1960’s pluralist theory. Connolly faulted pluralist theorists for 
ignoring the power dynamics between the groups that constituted American society. For 
Connolly, “politics was not simply a process for producing consensus, but rather a 
conflict that might result in some groups imposing their preferred policies on others.”13 
Therefore, Connolly instead promotes a notion of “agonistic respect,” which sees conflict 
between groups as something to be maintained, rather than something to be overcome 
through consensus, which would involve the domination of some groups over others. In 
                                                        
12“Agonism.” Encyclopedia of Political Theory. Eds. Mark Bevir. London: SAGE, 2010; EBSCO 
Publishing, p. 13 
13 Ibid 
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this vein, while I understand that Connolly’s agonism is born by his determination of 
conflict as inevitable, it also seems normative, as it suggests that conflict ought to be 
maintained for the benefit of pluralist politics. I therefore struggle to see why the 
Encyclopedia qualifies it as less normative than Mouffe’s, which will be explored below. 
 Other sources draw other distinctions. Andrew Schaap’s introduction in Law and 
Agonistic Politics, for instance, makes a distinction between pragmatic, expressivist, and 
strategic agonism.14 According to Schaap, pragmatic agonism is best represented by 
Chantal Mouffe who is one of the foremost scholars of agonism, with whom I began my 
study of agonal theory. Since Mouffe is so pervasive throughout the literature on agonal 
theory, and because she has been so central to my own understanding of agonal politics, I 
shall attempt to flesh out all that I have gathered from my readings of her work.  
 In prescribing “agonistic pluralism,” Mouffe boldly seeks to reject both traditional 
liberalism and “third-way” prescriptions of democratic politics, which attempt to 
eliminate conflict and contest. Mouffe finds such attempts overly moralistic, naïve, and 
unrealistic, given the realities of social relations within pluralist democracy. In fact, as the 
Encyclopedia of Political Theory explains in its entry on agonism, for Mouffe, “a 
properly political pluralism must countenance different positions that are genuinely 
incompatible with one another, that is to say, positions that may come into conflict with 
one another.”15 Anything that is “political,” according to Mouffe, is marked by this 
ineradicable conflict. Mouffe distinguishes “the political” from “politics”. What Mouffe 
means by this perhaps pedantic, certainly confusing, distinction is that “the political” 
                                                        
14 Law and Agonistic Politics. Eds. Andrew Schaap 1972-, Inc ebrary, and EBSCO Publishing (Firm). 
Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009. Web, p. 1 
15“Agonism.” Encyclopedia of Political Theory. Eds. Mark Bevir. London: SAGE, 2010; EBSCO 
Publishing, p. 13 
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refers to the  “antagonisms” inherent to the human social relations within pluralist 
democracies, which cannot be eliminated, while “politics,” on the other hand, Mouffe 
describes as “the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions, which seek to 
establish a certain order and organize human coexistence, in conditions that are always 
potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political.’”16 As 
such, “politics” is constantly affected by the antagonisms inherent to human society; it, 
along with its institutions, conversations, and processes, is concerned with internalizing, 
institutionalizing, and controlling the antagonistic relations that are inherent to “the 
political.”  
 As Mouffe outlines in The Democratic Paradox, by “providing channels through 
which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues”17 politics 
may succeed in its aims, and antagonistic relations can be transformed into agonistic 
ones. The distinction here (again, it is confusing for the reader) is that antagonistic 
relations are more akin to the relationship between enemies – the goal of each being to 
delegitimize and destroy the other – while agonistic relations, on the other hand, more 
closely resemble the relationship between adversaries. “Agonism is a we/they relation 
where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to 
their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents. They are 
‘adversaries’ not enemies.”18 It is at this point that one can identify (the former Nazi 
apologist) Carl Schmitt’s influence on Mouffe, and also recognize where Mouffe departs 
from Schmitt. Schmitt understands the political as the story of conflict between friend 
                                                        
16 Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London; New York: Verso, 2009, p. 101 
17 Ibid, 103 
18 Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London: Routledge, 2005, p. 20 
  9 
and foe. And Schmitt argues that this story will always end with the domination of one, 
and the destruction of the other. Mouffe agrees that the political, and therefore politics, is 
a story of conflict. But she rejects the idea that it must end with a stark dichotomy of 
victory and defeat. Instead, Mouffe presents an option of a sustained, “respectful” 
conflict that will not be eliminated, but will rage on in a controlled fashion.  
 Pausing briefly, I’ll attempt to put forth a quick summary of my account of 
Mouffe’s agonal theory so far. Mouffe has suggested that given the realities of pluralist 
democratic society, conflict is inevitable. As such, the task of politics is to channel this 
conflict through institutions and processes that serve as “a political outlet within a 
pluralistic democratic system.”19 Politics carves out a place for dissent, institutionalizing 
it, a process that Mouffe argues is “vital for a pluralist democracy.”20  
 Mouffe presents this idea of ‘agonistic pluralism’ in contrast to Schmitt’s notion 
of politics as mortal-combat between enemies, as well as other attempts that emphasize 
consensus and rationality, including those put forward by liberals like John Rawls, and 
proponents of “deliberative democracy,” like Jürgen Habermas. Mouffe regards the latter 
theories as failed attempts for “consensus without exclusion,” and argues that they merely 
attempt to eliminate the realities of “the political” – of social relations – from “politics”.21 
 Mouffe’s program, on the other hand, claims to account for the conflictual 
realities of human political relations and does not seek to establish a deep-seeded 
consensus as a result. Instead, she states that it attempts to foster unity in “a context of 
                                                        
19 Mouffe, Chantal. The Return of the Political. London: Verso, 1993, p. 5 
20 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 105 
21 Ibid, 48-49  
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conflict and diversity.”22 The following is my interpretation of what Mouffe means by 
this. Mouffe’s agonism accepts compromises as “part and parcel of politics,” but 
emphasizes these as “temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation.”23 And, moreover, 
it seems as though meaningful consensus can only appear in two forms. The first is what 
Mouffe calls a ‘conflictual consensus’.24  What she seems to mean by this is that there 
should be a general agreement on what the ‘ethico-political principles’ are – for instance 
liberty and equality in liberal democracy – but disagreement “concerning the meaning 
and implementation of those principles.”25 The second form of consensus accepted by 
Mouffe is a sort of mutual agreement that accepts difference as legitimate and consents to 
the continuation of a mutual struggle among competing values and interests.  Put in 
colloquial terms, it seems to be an agreement to disagree. Therefore, while there can be 
moments of agreement within politics, they only exist within the reality of conflict and 
disagreement.  
 As mentioned above, while many popular political theories might be apprehensive 
about such discord, Mouffe treats it as necessary for the maintenance of democratic forms 
of rule. In The Democratic Paradox she boldly states, “a well-functioning democracy 
calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions.”26 Additionally, she shares three 
warnings for what could happen to democracies if conflict is repressed or eradicated. 
First, she suggests that if democracy lacks clashing political positions, it may instead be 
                                                        
22 Ibid, 102 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid, 103 
25 Ibid, 102 
26 Ibid, 104 
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marked by “a confrontation among other forms of collective identification.”27 She fails to 
explain what these would be in The Democratic Paradox, but it seems to me that 
religious groups or other extra-political organizations and identities might be what she 
has in mind. Her second warning is that a marked emphasis on consensus, at the expense 
of dissention and discord, may lead to “apathy” and “disaffection with political 
participation.”28 Her ‘agonistic pluralism’, on the contrary, affords the presence of 
choices within politics, and outlines options for decisions to be made between, thus 
encouraging participation and procuring the vibrant democracy mentioned above. The 
final warning is that political repression of conflict may cause the “crystallization of 
collective passions around issues that cannot be managed by the democratic process.”29 
She again fails to flesh out what these “issues” would be, but she seems to be implying 
political extremism. It seems, therefore, by affording conflict within politics, agonism 
prevents citizens from turning to extremist groups that lay outside political institutions.  
 Up until now, this section on Mouffe has focused on her work as theoretical and 
remarkably broad. From this perspective, it is hard to imagine what agonism would look 
like, or how deep-seeded conflict would truly play out under ‘agonistic’ pluralism. But 
Mouffe begins to take on this project in The Democratic Paradox, examining how 
agonism appears within liberal democracy specifically. Mouffe explains that as societies 
have grown larger and more complex, democracy has evolved. She outlines that modern 
democracy is the product of two unique traditions – the liberal and democratic traditions. 
Mouffe states, 
                                                        
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
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with modern democracy, we are dealing with a new political 
form of society whose specificity comes from the 
articulation between two different traditions. On one side we 
have the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, the 
defense of human rights, and the respect of individual 
liberty; on the other, the democratic tradition whose main 
ideas are those of equality, identity between governing and 
governed and popular sovereignty.30  
 
Mouffe identifies a “tension” between these “different logics” of the liberal and 
democratic institutions of modern democracy.31 From here, Mouffe argues that we must 
understand that liberal democracy is the result of an articulation of two incompatible 
traditions, which cannot, and can never be, entirely reconciled. Tension between liberal 
and democratic traditions can only be “temporarily stabilized through pragmatic 
negotiations between political forces.”32 Because of this “constitutive tension,” liberal-
democratic regimes are marked by frequent struggles. However, Mouffe argues that these 
struggles have been the “driving forces of historical political developments.”33 And she 
continues by saying that only recently has this tension been rejected. Mouffe sees 
attempts to eradicate such tension emerging out of neo-liberalism.  
Mouffe’s claims have political aims; she is arguing against the “unchallenged 
hegemony” of neo-liberalism, which she views as threat to democratic institutions. 
Mouffe believes that the neoliberal perspective has promulgated the abandonment of the 
“traditional liberal struggle of the left for equality.”34 She sees a movement towards an 
increasingly “one dimensional” world, and calls for the end of this trend. As such, in true 
agonist form, she also rejects the “rational consensus” and “deliberative” theories of the 
                                                        
30 Ibid, 2-3 
31 Ibid, 4 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid, 5 
34 Ibid, 6 
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political. She comments that these models fail to understand the true dynamics of 
democratic politics, discussed earlier, which are characterized by contestation. Mouffe 
states that the rationalist approach is blind to the agonistic nature of the political – this 
blindness has serious consequences for democratic politics.35 Similarly, proponents of 
“deliberative democracy,” fail to understand that tension is an inherent aspect of modern 
democracies, due to the liberal-democratic paradox discussed above. Mouffe sees any 
attempts to permanently quell this tension, like those of John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas, 
as simply favoring one side over the other – she argues that Rawls favors liberalism, 
while Habermas favors democracy.  
 What Mouffe presents for liberal-democracy instead is not “the search for an 
inaccessible consensus…but an ‘agonistic confrontation’ between conflicting 
interpretations of the constitutive liberal-democratic values.”36 This is the reemergence 
and manifestation of Mouffe’s manifesto for ‘agonistic pluralism’. To revisit what this 
means, Mouffe is advocating the notion that “pluralist democratic politics consists in 
pragmatic, precarious and necessarily unstable forms of negotiating its constitutive 
paradox.”37 Ultimately, Mouffe sees this program as a means of again rejecting Carl 
Schmitt; this time, she rejects his specific condemnation of democracy as a “non-viable 
regime.”38 (Schmitt believes that liberal-democracy cannot sustain this tension between 
liberty and equality, and argues that eventually one value must win out over the other. 
The dominance of equality, Schmitt believes, will lead popular government towards 
tyranny, while the dominance of liberty will move popular government towards anarchy.) 
                                                        
35 Ibid, 11 
36 Ibid, 9 
37 Ibid, 11 
38 Ibid, 9 
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Therefore, the tension between liberalism and democracy, for Schmitt, is the terminal 
“mode of contradiction.”39 For Mouffe, on the other hand, this tension is the “locus of 
paradox.” 40 As such, Mouffe is interpreting the tension of liberal-democracy as a positive 
political condition. This is evident when she states, 
by constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-
exclusion implied by the political constitution of ‘the 
people’ – required by the exercise of democracy – the 
liberal discourse of universal human rights plays an 
important role in maintaining the democratic contestation 
alive. On the other side, it is only thanks to the democratic 
logics of equivalence that frontiers can be created and a 
demos established without which no real exercise of 
human rights could be possible.41  
 
Mouffe acknowledges that, in truth, the conflictual nature of the relationship between 
liberalism and democracy will prevent each from being entirely realized. “Both perfect 
liberty and perfect equality become impossible. But this is the very condition of 
possibility for a pluralist form of human coexistence in which rights can exist and be 
exercised, in which freedom and equality somehow manage to coexist.”42 When one 
accepts the conflict and division inherent to liberal-democracies, they can then 
understand how modern liberal democracy “creates a space in which this confrontation is 
kept open, power relations are always being put into question, and no victory can be 
final.”43  
 Mouffe’s commentary on the liberal-democratic paradox is relevant to my own 
thesis that tension lies at the center of the American polity, and is engrained in American 
                                                        
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid, 10 
42 Ibid, 11 
43 Ibid  
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politics as a result. The paradoxical nature of the relationship between liberty and 
equality is an idea that has been introduced throughout my studies of American political 
thought, most notably through the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. Thus, what I find even 
more interesting than Mouffe’s acknowledgement of the liberal-democratic paradox, is 
that Tocqueville is absent from it. This will be discussed again in the chapter on 
Tocqueville’s thought specifically, but it is worth mentioning here, especially since the 
current chapter will soon consider how agonism appears in broader political thought. 
Tocqueville distinctly accommodates the tension between liberty and equality within his 
political thought, and yet he is not mentioned or cited once in Mouffe’s book that is all 
about the tension that exists between liberty and equality (referring to The Democratic 
Paradox).  For Tocqueville, though the two political values do not always lend 
themselves to one another, democracy is best maintained when equality and liberty are 
properly balanced, when a maintainable tension between the two values is sustained. To 
me, this sounds remarkably akin to what Mouffe advocates for liberal-democracy by 
putting forth her prescription of ‘agonistic pluralism’.  
 Having come to the end of this brief critique on the absence of Tocqueville, this 
study’s analysis of Chantal Mouffe’s particular agonal perspective – which Andrew 
Schaap calls “pragmatic agonism” – is complete. And as such, it will now briefly outline 
the other agonal perspectives that Schaap points out. The first of these is expressivist 
agonism.  Schaap holds that expressivist agonism is represented, most notably, by 
William Connolly. Expressivist theories are heavily grounded in an appreciation of 
pluralism. Theories that fall under expressivist agonism, as stated by Schaap,  
emphasize the value of struggle in sustaining freedom and 
plurality and resisting social identities that may be 
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experienced as oppressive. The agon is celebrated as a 
never-ending play of differences, which resists the 
homogenizing drive for social unity, enabling plurality to 
flourish.44  
 
The aim of politics, for expressive agonism, is to promote pluralism; accepting conflict 
within the realm of the politics is determined as necessary for the sake of pluralism.  
 The second of the remaining theories of agonism presented by Schaap is strategic 
agonism.  Schaap states that this theoretical perspective is advocated in the work of 
Jacque Ranciere, who, admittedly, I have not come across before finding him mentioned 
by Schaap. As Schaap outlines, strategic perspectives of agonism see conflict within 
politics as a means to protect against social exclusion or domination. For example, this 
theory of agonism could imagine a situation in which conflict occurring between first and 
second-class citizens, between those who are included and those who are excluded from 
politics, works “to abolish the social inequalities between them.”45 As such, for strategic 
agonists, conflict can help secure democratic ideas of equality and inclusion.  
 I have not gone through the task of analyzing either expressivist agonism or 
strategic agonism as deeply as I have pragmatic agonism, as put forward by Mouffe. I 
have more fully expounded on Mouffe because she is more relevant to my own argument.  
 So far, this chapter has introduced agonism, explained its core ideas, and has 
acknowledged and explored some of its various forms and perspectives. Now, it will 
move to a brief discussion of the theories of democratic politics that agonism is offered in 
contrast to. First, agonism is offered in stark contrast to the neoliberal perspective of 
democratic politics. Centered on the formation of a rational consensus based on universal 
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principles of justice and led by one of the foremost post-war liberal thinkers, John Rawls, 
this tradition envisions that justice is achieved when individual rights are obtained, and 
maintained, through a society that has eliminated conflict by reaching “a rational 
consensus grounded on universally valid moral principles.”46 Rawls in particular is 
concerned with how peaceful coexistence may be fostered among a population with 
numerous, different conceptions of the good.47 Previous authors had described democracy 
as having the procedural ability to regulate such a conflict of views in a neutral fashion; 
Rawls rejects this and argues for a more meaningful, pervasive consensus to be formed, 
one based on “moral, albeit minimal, consensus on political fundamentals.”48 And in his 
book, Political Liberalism, Rawls brings this to light with his notion of reasonable 
pluralism. Under reasonable pluralism, which results from the exercise of reason, people 
have realized their moral principles and, as such, are free and equal citizens in a 
constitutional regime; cooperation is their creed. Chantal Mouffe critically comments that 
with Rawls’ reasonable pluralism, “political liberalism can provide consensus among 
reasonable persons who, by definition, are persons who accept the principles of political 
liberalism.”49 More generally, a main objection to Rawls’ reasonable pluralism, and the 
broader neo-Kantian, rational consensus tradition is the heavy, sometimes overpowering 
presence of moral, rather than political, considerations. Some, including Reinhardt 
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Koselleck, make this critique to such an extent that they express a belief that this tradition 
misunderstands the purely political.50  
 The second concept of democratic politics that agonism is offered in contrast to is 
called discourse theory,51 or as Mouffe refers to it, deliberative democracy. Pursued most 
prominently by Jürgen Habermas, discourse theory contends that unrestricted 
participation in a process of free and rational public discourse is necessary to secure 
legitimacy in a modern democratic state. Rather than viewing the political as the forum 
for individual rights, Habermas understands the political as the source of people’s 
identity as free and equal political agents. It is through political life, most ideally a 
political life centered on transparent and open communication, that social character and 
personal identity are secured. 52 Mouffe explains that the main idea behind deliberative 
democracy is that in a democratic polity decisions should be reached through a process of 
deliberation among free and equal citizens.”53 And while this notion of deliberation has 
been central to democracy since its inception in 5th century Athens, how ‘deliberation’ 
has been interpreted and defined has vastly differed.  
Noel O’Sullivan discloses three common problems associated with discourse 
theory as presented by Habermas. The first is similar to the objections to Rawls’ rational 
consensus presented previously; discourse theory seems to assume that a set of neutral 
procedural principles can be reached, despite the vast diversity associated with modern 
society. Second, critics take issues with Habermas’ idea that the formation of a universal 
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“rational will” is feasible. Third, Habermas’ discourse theory makes a leap that 
transparent communication will naturally lead to consensus and uniformity. O’Sullivan 
states, “It is not clear, however, why Habermas ignores the possibility that transparency, 
even if it can be achieved, might not bring conflict and hatred instead of harmony,”54 
exemplifying this by describing the relationship between Israel and Palestine – the two 
“understand each other very well, but this does not guarantee a solution of any kind to 
their conflict.”55  
 Chantal Mouffe notes that agonal theory is also presented in contrast to a third 
democratic theory – the aggregate model of democracy. The aggregate model predates 
the rational consensus and deliberative models, which are offered as alternatives to it. 
This theory, which was presented in Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1942), focuses on the empirical rather than the normative; it understands the 
democratic process as one which is not centered on popular sovereignty, but on the 
“aggregation of preferences, taking place through political parties for which people 
would have the capacity to vote at regular intervals.”56 In this vein, notions of a “common 
good” or “general will” are subjugated to special interests. ”Pluralism of interests and 
values ha[s] to be acknowledged as coextensive with the very idea of ‘the people.’”57 
 While Mouffe presents the aggregate model in contrast to agonal theory, I 
struggle to understand them as definitively distinct. Mouffe believes that the aggregate 
model shares some of the flaws of the rational consensus and deliberative democracy 
theories, namely that the aggregate model still privileges rationality, forgetting the 
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massive effects of the passions. But while Mouffe says that the aggregate model relies 
too heavily on rationality, I do not see the model she purposes as any less rational. 
Moreover, even if one believes that special interests only result from rational thought, a 
belief I find to be a bit naïve, surely one cannot reject the role that the passions play in the 
party politics that lie at the center of the aggregate model. Turning back to Mouffe’s 
criticisms of the aggregate model, she also takes issue with the increased individualism 
that results out of an aggregate model of democracy. She advocates for the active 
involvement of citizens in a democracy, and argues that this kind of participation can 
only be procured “by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, the forms of life that 
foster identification with democratic values.”58 But why can’t special interests or political 
parties foster an identification with democratic valued?  And if conflicting political 
parties and special interests are acknowledged as inherent to politics, are they not the 
manifestation of multiplied institutions? Do they not represent an increase in discourses? 
Finally, how can they be distinguished from the “pluralism” central to Mouffe’s agonal 
theory?  
 So far, this chapter has described agonism and its central ideas, and presented 
other theories of democratic politics that lie in contrast to agonism. It will now turn to 
identifying where agonism sits within broader political theory. As stated at the start of 
this chapter, agonism gets its name from the Greek agon. Andreas Kalyvas, in his chapter 
of Schaap’s Law and Agonistic Politics, suggests that agonism descends from Greek 
Antiquity. As Kalyvas points out, agon in ancient Greece meant conflict or struggle, and 
he puts forth that agon was used in reference to athletic competitions, oral debates, or the 
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competition between characters in literature.59 In defending a position similar to 
Kalyvas’, Mark Wenman explains that in Greek antiquity, agonism appeared as “the 
contest between adversaries in the athletic games and rivalry among characters in tragic 
drama.”60 In this light, agon seems to have referred to the struggle of individuals, and of 
their individual souls. But neither Kalyvas nor Wenman point out any political 
connotation, much less one that celebrates the effects of tension.  
 One can see an example of this description of the agon, which focuses on tension 
on an individual level, by looking to the second century Greek stoic Chryssipus. 
Chryssipus, it is important to note, does present a concept of positive tension. As Wendell 
John Coats, Jr. explains in an endnote in his essay, “A Theory of Republican Character,” 
Chryssipus puts forward a notion that moderate tension can be a source of health and 
order.61 According to Chryssipus, men’s wrongdoings, shortcomings, or failures are the 
result of a lack, or collapse, of tension in the soul. Right actions, on the other hand, are 
“guided by right judgment together with the soul’s good tension.”62 This appreciation of 
tension within the soul seems to emerge out of Stoic ideas on physics, specifically those 
relating to the elements. In A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley’s The Hellenistic Philosophers, it 
is noted that stoic philosophy distinguishes the elements of fire and air from those of 
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earth and water. Fire and air are said to sustain themselves because of a sort of tensile 
breath. 63 A description of this breath states,  
‘Breath’ consists of a ‘through-and-through blending’ of its 
two constitutive elements, which means that any portion of 
it, irrespective of size, is characterized by hot and cold. 
Chryssipus deduces from this that ‘breath’ is a dynamic 
continuum, in part expanding from its heat (fire) and in part 
contracting from its cold (air). This complex motion was 
described as ‘tension’ or ‘tensile movement’… The special 
character of this motion is its simultaneous activity in 
opposite directions, outwards and inwards…the stoics 
explained the apparent stability and properties of everyday 
objects by the ‘tensile movement’ of their constituent 
elements.64 
 
Herein, tension equates to stability, signaling an appreciation of tension in Chryssipus’ 
stoicism. However, his praise of tension is limited to tension within the natural world of 
elements or within the soul of individuals. It never touches on tension within society as a 
whole or in the realm of politics. 
 Friedrich Nietzsche, however, broadens what the Greek agon signified, explaining 
that it applies to the political sphere as well.65 As Lawrence J. Hatab writes in his 2008 
work, Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morality, “Nietzsche spotlights the pervasiveness 
in ancient Greece of the agon, or contest for excellence, which operated in all cultural 
pursuits (in athletics, the arts, oratory, politics, and philosophy).”66 The agon seems to 
have entertained the idea of the world as a forum for “the struggle of opposing (but 
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related) forces,”67 and is evident in Homer’s Iliad, Hesiod’s Theogony, Greek tragedy, as 
well as in the work of philosophers, including Anaximander and Heraclitus.68  Moreover, 
the Greek agon, as explored by Nietzsche, seems to have made a distinction that is 
notably similar to Mouffe’s distinction between agonism and antagonism. Hatab speaks 
to this, saying:  
In Homer’s Contest, Nietzsche argues that the agon 
emerged as a cultivation of more brutal natural drives in not 
striving for the annihilation of the Other, but arranging 
contests that would test skill and performance in 
competition. Accordingly, agonistic strife produced 
excellence, not obliteration, since talent unfolded in a 
struggle with competitors. In this way, the Greeks did not 
succumb to a false idea of sheer harmony, and so they 
insured a proliferation of excellence by preventing 
stagnation and uniform control. The agon expressed the 
general resistance of the Greeks to “unified domination” 
and the danger of unchallenged or unchallengeable 
power.69 
 
However, despite Nietzsche’s explanation of the Greek agon and its application to 
politics, there was “no political philosophy of agonism” in ancient Greece, nor is there 
any literature that seems to have been specifically devoted to it.70 One should also note 
that the two giants of Greek political thought, Plato and Aristotle, did not afford any 
room for tension or conflict in politics.  
Looking back to 4th Century BCE, Plato’s writing in The Republic emphasizes 
that his political philosophy has little tolerance for pluralism, much less tension. Plato 
writes with justice as his end. The perfect city, which Plato depicts in The Republic, is 
just and good. In being both just and good it is perfectly ordered according to nature. 
                                                        
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid, 13-14 
70 Kalyvas, 18 
  24 
This, moreover, is consistent with his analysis of justice in the individual as well, which 
may be useful to explore before turning to the city. It is important to mention that 
although Plato seems to recognize ‘parts’ of the city and of the soul, his thought does not 
fully accommodate pluralism. As represented in The Republic, Plato’s political 
philosophy still emphasizes unity and condemns “divisions [as] morally unwholesome 
and politically fatal.”71 Plato’s just city features “an organic body politic, an indivisible 
nation (or people), unitary royal[s] …[and] one determinable common good.”72 And most 
importantly, for Plato, “parts must be cast as natural, unalterable elements of an 
indivisible city or soul.”73 
  I will look to Plato’s teachings on the soul first. Through Socrates’ dialectic 
argument with Adeimantus and Glaucon, Plato extols that for the individual “justice is 
respect to what is within”74 and that, to achieve justice within, one must properly order the 
parts of the soul. By ordering the soul, one becomes their own sovereign entity. The 
notion that a proper ordering of the appetites of the soul - both the necessary and 
unnecessary desires - produces justice is thoroughly discussed in Book IV - 
He doesn’t let...the three classes of the soul meddle with 
each other, but really sets his own...in good order and rules 
himself; he arranges himself...and harmonizes the three 
parts... And if there are some other parts in between, he 
binds them together and becomes entirely one from the 
many, moderate and harmonized. 75 
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Through the perfect moderation and harmonization of the reasoning, the spirited, and the 
desiring, the soul of an individual can be just. And as Socrates states, for Plato, “the just 
man [is] not any different from the just city.”76 Exactly as a just soul, by being properly 
ordered, becomes a sovereign entity unto itself, a properly ordered city will also become 
sovereign and just. Again, identically to the soul of an individual, “one would find many 
diverse desires, pleasures, and pains”77 within a city. To obtain justice, consequently, the 
city must properly organize its parts. Socrates remarks that a city must have its better 
parts ruling over the worse78 and should be “entirely moderate.”79 Moderation in service 
of the unity of a city will make that city just, precisely as moderation in service of unity 
within an individual soul made that soul just. As just is virtually synonymous with good – 
moderation and harmony, or unanimity, will make for a good city. Herein, Plato’s 
political thought does not accommodate pluralism. Furthermore, it embraces “harmony” 
and “moderation” and thereby eschews any sort of tension or conflict. 
Aristotle, Plato’s most famous student, parts slightly with his teacher by 
accommodating pluralism in his own political thought. The mixed regime that Aristotle 
puts forth in Politics accommodates “social divisions within the frame of government”80 
Moreover, while Plato, in the Republic, had characterized factions or parts in a city or 
soul as markers of injustice and advocated for unity, Aristotle sees things differently. For 
him, “the distribution of virtue required for unity was inconceivable.”81 Instead, Aristotle 
accepts the presence of parts within society as a fact. He recognizes discrete social 
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groupings and conflicting interests, and treats them as inevitable aspects of human 
society.  
But Aristotle still by no means accommodates conflict or tension within his 
politics. True, he accepts parts, but he asserts that they must be tempered, ordered and 
moderated. Nancy Rosenblum comments in her book, On the Side of the Angels, that for 
Aristotle, “the Polis is a compound whole composed of differentiated parts… differences 
[are] acknowledged and brought into government…the public good is a judicious 
arrangement of heterogeneous parts.”82 In Politics, Aristotle discusses the possible 
regime types, including monarchy, aristocracy, constitutional government [polity], and 
their respective inversions, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Through this discussion 
Aristotle concludes that the best of the practicable constitutions is a polity (but this is still 
far from the “absolute best regime” that he presents). And even this practicable polity of 
Books III and IV of Politics, which unlike his best regime is not aimed at absolute 
excellence, still relies of the virtue of moderation. As stated by one commentator, the 
virtues that a polity is supposedly capable of,  
are more defined by their usefulness in holding together a 
body politic than by their similarity to self-contained and 
self-sufficient divine-like virtues, capable of being done for 
their own sake.83 
 
Aristotle’s polity works to create a sense of balance and a moderate outcome; an end 
goal of unity underscores his thought.  
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 Identifying that the two foremost classical Greek political theorists neither 
afforded nor appreciated tension within politics denotes a gap in where agonism can be 
identified in ancient Greece. As Kalyvas admits, 
one has to revisit Greek antiquity and to sift through 
fragmented and dispersed textual and material sources in 
mythology, poetry, theatre, rhetoric, historiography, 
philosophy, visual representation, architecture and 
archaeology and try to combine and interpret the  findings  
into  an  eclectic,  tentative  and  uncertain  framework  that  
cannot  but accept its own unavoidable arbitrariness.84 
 
But at least some ancient Greek political thought, seen above in the discussion of the 
agon, particularly as it was described by Nietzsche, accepted an “ idea that conflict, 
suffering, and strife are endemic in social and political life and not a contemporary 
condition on a journey towards reconciliation.”85  
 Moving on from agonism’s origins in the Greek agon, agonism appears to have a 
connection to Roman Stoicism as well. As put to words by Cicero, Roman Stoicism 
exhibits another acceptance and appreciation of tension. As Coats argues in his essay 
“Groundwork for a Theory of Republican Character in a Democratic Age,” Roman 
Stoicism holds that a well-maintained tension within the body and soul helps to resist the 
corruptive effects that pleasure and pain have on one’s character.86 Coats quotes Cicero in 
the Tusculan Disputations on this point. Cicero states, “the soul must strain every nerve 
in the performance of its duties; in this alone does duty find its safeguard.”87 Discipline, 
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like military discipline or that obtained through oratory, would help procure and sustain 
tension. This still marks just a momentary appreciation of tension that is operating on the 
individual level. But since internal tension helps the individual to succeed in civil life, it 
has implications for the political realm as well.  
However, agonistic political ideas do not receive a comprehensive, formal 
introduction until the modern era when Machiavelli comments on the discord between the 
Senate and the plebs of Rome in his Discourses on Livy. This connection (which even 
Mouffe notes), in addition to the connections discussed above, allows one to recognize 
agonism as an offspring of more mainstream political thought, rather than casting it off as 
a contemporary, radical, fringe theory. In fact, the central tenets of agonism – that tension 
is an inevitable fact of pluralist political society and is a necessary or even positive force 
in politics – appear in the thought of numerous modern political thinkers. This brings to 
light that, despite the fact that agonism has only gained significance as a political theory 
over the last 20 years, the central ideas of agonism may not be entirely original. Although 
the consolidation of its central ideas into one formalized theory is novel, as the next 
chapter will emphasize, the ideas that constitute agonism have been said before.  
The question, therefore, is where and by whom have these agonal ideas been put 
forward? In his Agonistic Democracy, Mark Wenman states that agonism “represents a 
contemporary adaptation of republican theory.”88  And similarly, Gulshan Khan, in his 
article “Critical republicanism: Jürgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe,” points out that 
within republicanism there is an acknowledgement of “ the value of non-violent conflict 
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in the public realm.”89 True, rather than viewing conflict as inherently detrimental, many 
republican theorists see “contestation and disagreement as a productive force by which to 
strengthen a free state.”90 And agonal theory can clearly be associated with the broad 
republican tradition. However, I believe that agonism’s roots are not solely republican. Its 
forefather (speaking of Machiavelli) may have been a republican, but not all its ancestors 
were. As the following chapter will emphasize, theorists across a number of schools of 
modern political thought include some sort of appreciation of conflict and tension in their 
work. This ultimately underscores that agonal theory is relevant to politics in a broader 
way than one might imagine, and it should not be solely examined in the context of 
radical democratic theory, or even republicanism, but placed in dialogue with the much 
broader modern political tradition.  
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CHAPTER II 
Agonism in Modern Political Thought: Moments of Appreciation and 
Opposition  
 
“Seeing then the impossibility of establishing in this respect a perfect equilibrium, and 
that a precise middle course cannot be maintained…I believe it therefore necessary 
rather to take the constitution of Rome as a model than that of any other republic.” 
–Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy 
 
This chapter is focused on identifying agonal theory within modern Western 
political tradition. It will examine a statement made towards the end of the previous 
chapter that identified Machiavelli as the forefather of agonal theory. From this point it 
will chart other moments of appreciation of tension amongst Machiavelli’s 
contemporaries, and then mention a few moments of opposition, as agonal ideas are not 
universally accepted by all modern political theorists.  
Machiavelli 
Machiavelli, having written his magisterial Discourses on Livy in the 16th century, 
is credited as being “the most influential early modern republican.”91 However, many 
solely remember Machiavelli as a schemer operating in the vice driven undercurrents of 
Renaissance politics, motivated by power and avarice. To these people, he is the author 
of The Prince; the father of the notion that it is better to be feared than loved.92 This 
painting of Machiavelli seems dark, emphasizing the shadowy aspects of Machiavelli’s 
thought. Upon closer inspection, however, Machiavelli’s political thought may not be 
quite so stark. Instead, Machiavelli may be a human example of pentimento. An art term, 
pentimento describes a sign or trace in an artistic work of an alteration, mistake, or earlier 
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composition, seen through surface layers of paint on a canvas.93 While on the surface 
Machiavelli was the seemingly immoral architect behind The Prince, careful and critical 
inspection allows one to see the lighter tones of his thought emerging from the 
background.  
As Harvey Mansfield argues in the preface to his book New Modes and Orders: A 
Study of the Discourses on Livy, to appreciate Machiavelli’s broad contributions to 
political thought, especially to the American tradition, one need look beyond the “vulgar” 
conception of Machiavelli as “a teacher of evil.”94 In perceiving that Machiavelli did not 
aim to introduce “evil” into politics, but instead aimed to introduce republicanism into 
renaissance politics, one can better appreciate these contributions. In fact, as Harvey 
Mansfield states, one “can learn to see how the control of things not previously or usually 
thought political is represented in his discussion of political things.”95 In this vein, this 
chapter will argue that Machiavelli is the first to explicitly introduce tension as an aspect 
of the political. It will then examine Machiavelli’s comments on the usefulness of 
controlling, or maintaining, well-balanced tension to conclude that Machiavelli is the 
forefather of modern agonal political thought.  
Machiavelli’s thoughts on tension in politics are most obvious in Book I of the 
Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy. Despite the fact that The Prince often 
outshines the Discourses as Machiavelli’s most infamous work, the latter has been 
regarded as the truest to his actual political thinking. From this perspective, the 
Discourses exhibits Machiavelli’s preference for republican schemes of government and 
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explains how they might be maintained. As Maurizio Viroli points out in his biography of 
Machiavelli, entitled Niccolo’s Smile, “the Discourses became an intellectual and 
political guide for all those who embraced the ideals of republican liberty and sought…to 
replace the rule of princes and kings with free republics.”96  
Machiavelli details the history of the Roman republic not in an effort to simply 
recount what has already been written down, but rather, to “persuade his readers of the 
political wisdom of the Romans and to move his readers to imitate them.”97 It is with this 
in mind that one can more fully appreciate Machiavelli’s novel statement that the stability 
and longevity of the Roman republic was a product of the tension existing between the 
Senate and the people, and that it was this that kept the republic free, and allowed it to 
avoid stagnancy and delay decay.98 In this statement, Machiavelli is introducing tension 
as inherent to the political.  As Gisela Bock points out in her chapter on civil discord in 
Machiavelli and Republicanism, Machiavelli demonstrates “the intrinsic conflictuality of 
the political universe.”99 And from there he goes further, advocating that by controlling 
or maintaining well-balanced political tension, a republic may flourish. 
  Underlying Machiavelli’s appreciation of tension is an accommodation of 
pluralism. In The Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli describes the plebs and the grandi of 
Rome as distinct social groups and accepts the existence and legitimacy of both. 
Machiavelli, however, not only accepts pluralism, but also accepts and appreciates the 
tension that results from such pluralism, which he regards as inevitable, noting that the 
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nobility and the people had long been at ends. Machiavelli rejects unity as essentially 
impossible. Exemplifying this through the Roman example, he observes that when the 
Tarquins were expelled there seemed to be a “very great union” between the plebs and 
the Senate. However, he casts this aside as an untruthful aberration; the Senate was 
merely attempting to secure the plebs as allies. Following the death of the Tarquins, “the 
nobles began to spit out the venom against the plebs which they had held in their breasts 
and harmed it in every way they could.”100 For Machiavelli, therefore, unity can only be 
the product of deceit. Disunion and the tension that results from disunion are inevitable 
and inherent to politics. But Machiavelli does not treat disunion, as represented by the 
“quarrels of the Senate and the people of Rome,” as terribly destructive. In this vein, he 
separates himself from those in the classical tradition who would view such a conflict as 
purely negative, disorderly, and turbulent101– referring to Plato and Aristotle in particular. 
While Plato and Aristotle would have seen the disunion between the Senate and the plebs 
as an imminent threat, Machiavelli praises it. 
 Here, the novelty of Machiavelli’s commentary on the discord between the Senate 
and the plebs of Rome becomes even more evident. For him, this civil discord was “the 
leaven and cement of a free republic.”102 He is sure to point out that the disunion seems to 
have brought about little harm; it did not bring about exile or death, nor did it divide the 
republic. He states, 
Within the space of over three hundred years, the 
differences between these parties caused but very few exiles, 
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and cost still less blood; they cannot therefore be regarded 
as having been very injurious and fatal to a republic.103  
 
Machiavelli also emphasizes that the tumults were not detrimental to virtue in Rome. 
Rather, he explains that “good examples [of virtue] arise from good education, good 
education from good laws, and good laws from the very tumults”104 in question.  Thus, 
while Machiavelli holds the diverse humors of the Senate and plebs to be irreconcilable, 
he understands the discord between them as a positive force. According to his headings for 
chapters three and four of Book I, Machiavelli asserts that the tension between the Senate 
and the plebs “caused the creation of the tribunes of the plebs in Rome, which made the 
republic more perfect,”105 and that it also “made that republic free and powerful.”106 
However, while Machiavelli promises to go through the events that led to the creation of 
the tribunes, and thereby secured Rome’s liberty and power, he fails to do so. At this 
point, therefore, I will turn to Livy and detail the tumults to which Machiavelli is 
referring.  
 In Book II, Chapter 23 of the History of Rome, Livy states that “the patricians and 
the plebeians were bitterly hostile to one another.”107 He explains that this was largely 
because of the poor conditions of the debtors. Livy shares the story of one debtor, a 
soldier-turned-slave, who appears before the Forum. He is described as corpse-like, 
emaciated, and nearly savage in appearance. According to Livy, upon seeing this man and 
hearing his story, “a great outcry arose; the excitement was not confined to the Forum, it 
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spread everywhere throughout the City,”108 and the plebeians actively revolted against the 
nobility.  Livy states, “civic discord rent the State in twain.”109 Livy details another tumult 
in chapter 28. He explains that in this episode the Senate passed a levy calling the plebs to 
active service. However,  
After dismissing the senate, the consuls ascended the 
tribunal and called out the names of those liable to active 
service. Not a single man answered to his name. The 
people, standing round as though in formal assembly, 
declared that the plebs could no longer be imposed upon, 
the consuls should not get a single soldier until the promise 
made in the name of the State was fulfilled. Before arms 
were put into their hands, every man's liberty must be 
restored to him, that they might fight for their country and 
their fellow-citizens and not for tyrannical masters.  
  
The Senate refused this request, and demanded the consuls to enforce the levy. As the 
consuls attempted to do so, a fight erupted between the Senators and the plebians. Livy is 
careful to note that “there had, however, been no stones thrown or weapons used, it had 
resulted in more noise and angry words than personal injury.”110  In response to this 
episode, the Senate created a Dictator to rule over the plebs. But a “man of moderate 
temper”, who was not feared by the plebs, M. Valerius, was appointed as Dictator. 
Ultimately, Valerius resigned the Dictatorship out of frustration with how the Senate 
continued to treat the plebs and how it navigated the conflicts between the warring 
factions.  
 As wars were waged, the contests between the patricians and the plebs continued 
within Rome. Livy remarks, “the course which domestic affairs were taking continued to 
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be a source of anxiety to both the patricians and the plebeians.”111 Eventually, when the 
discord intensified even more greatly, a large number of plebeians withdrew from the city 
to the Sacred Mount about three miles away. At this point,  
A great panic seized the City, mutual distrust led to a state 
of universal suspense. Those plebeians who had been left 
by their comrades in the City feared violence from the 
patricians; the patricians feared the plebeians who still 
remained in the City, and could not make up their minds 
whether they would rather have them go or stay. "How 
long," it was asked, "would the multitude who had seceded 
remain quiet? What would happen if a foreign war broke 
out in the meantime?" They felt that all their hopes rested 
on concord amongst the citizens, and that this must be 
restored at any cost.112 
 
And as a result, the Senate sent Menenius Agrippa, who was of plebeian origin, to make 
amends.  Livy explains that Agrippa won over the plebeians by describing a fable of the 
parts of the body warring against each other as a metaphor for the discord between the 
Senate and the plebs. In the negotiations for reconciliation that followed, “an agreement 
was arrived at, the terms being that the plebs should have its own magistrates, whose 
persons were to be inviolable, and who should have the right of affording protection 
against the consuls. And further, no patrician should be allowed to hold that office.”113 
Herein the tribunes were created.  
 Having charted the events that Machiavelli fails to describe, we can turn to his 
assertions about their importance. As stated above, Machiavelli asserts that the tension 
between the Senate and the plebs “caused the creation of the tribunes of the plebs in 
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Rome, which made the republic more perfect.”114 He adds that it also “made that republic 
free and powerful.”115 The following paragraphs will examine these claims. 
 At the end of chapter 3 of Book I of the Discourses, Machiavelli states that the 
“the troubles of Rome,” (speaking of the discord between the Senate and the plebs,) 
“occasioned the creation of the Tribunes.”116 In turn, the Tribunes “formed a powerful 
barrier between the Senate and the people, which curbed the insolence of the former.”117 
Thus, the Tribunes provided a formal system to effectively control and maintain the 
discord between these two groups; they functioned as a check on the nobles’ power, and 
prevented their abuse of the people. But furthermore, the creation of the Tribunes also 
constituted Rome as a properly mixed regime, introducing a “popular” or “democratic” 
element of government to the “monarchical” and “aristocratic” institutions that had been 
in place. As such, Rome became what “sagacious legislators” have determined to be “most 
stable and solid.”118 Therefore, it was through the discord between the Senate and the 
plebs that “a combination was formed of the three powers, which rendered the constitution 
perfect.”119  
 The next major benefit that Machiavelli identifies as a product of the tension 
between the Senate and the plebs is that “all the laws that are favorable to liberty result 
from the opposition of these parties to each other, as may easily be seen from the events 
that occurred in Rome.”120 By making this point, Machiavelli extends his commentary on 
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the creation of the tribunes. As was made clear above, for Machiavelli, the disunion 
between the Senate and the plebs, as described in the events chronicled by Livy, was the 
precise cause for the creation of the Tribunes. But these events also afforded “the people 
the opportunity of giving vent, so to say, their ambition.”121 And the tribunes, once 
created, still provided the people with an institution through which to “vent.” Machiavelli 
says of the tribunes, “they cannot be praised too highly; for besides giving to the people a 
share in the public administration, these Tribunes were established as the most assured 
guardians of Roman liberty.”122  Machiavelli does not see the people’s “venting” as 
detrimental, but instead holds that it guarded liberty in Rome, because he trusts the people, 
more than the nobles, to best safeguard liberty. This is evident when he states, “the 
demands of a free people are rarely pernicious to their liberty; they are generally inspired 
by oppressions, experienced or apprehended.”123  
 However, Machiavelli does eventually accept the quarrels between the people and 
Senate of Rome as “the cause of [its] loss of liberty,”124 and inquires whether Rome could 
have employed a system based on unity as had existed in Sparta and Venice. In assessing 
this question, Machiavelli concludes that because both Sparta and Venice were generally 
small enough in number and did not welcome newcomers into government they were able 
to preserve their systems of government and enjoy unity. Machiavelli determines that for 
Rome to have accomplished this it would not have been able “to employ the people in the 
armies, like the Venetians, or…open the doors to strangers, as had been the case in 
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Sparta.”125 Rome, however, took the opposite path. As a result, Rome vested more power 
with the people, and invited contest and turbulence. Despite this, however, Machiavelli 
asserts that  
had [Rome] been more tranquil, it would necessarily have 
resulted that she would have been more feeble, and that she 
would have lost with her energy also the ability of 
achieving that high degree of greatness to which she 
attained.126 
 
For Machiavelli, when tension between factions is absent, political systems will be 
characterized by stagnation, or will be susceptible to decay; they will be characterized by 
weakness, rather than power. Moreover, although Machiavelli does acquiesce in the idea 
that the hypothetically best political existence for a State is one that is peaceful within 
and without, and marked by equilibrium and tranquility, he notes that such an existence is 
impossible. Such an existence could only exist in a political vacuum, devoid of human 
nature. For as he states at the end of Chapter VI –  
 
As all human things are kept in a perpetual movement, and 
can never remain stable, states naturally either rise or 
decline, and necessity compels them to many acts to which 
reason will not influence them…Seeing then the 
impossibility of establishing in this respect a perfect 
equilibrium, and that a precise middle course cannot be 
maintained…I believe it therefore necessary rather to take 
the constitution of Rome as a model than that of any other 
republic, and to tolerate the differences that will arise 
between the Senate and the people as an inconvenient 
necessity in achieving greatness like that of Rome.127  
 
In his extensive work, The Machiavellian Moment, JGA Pocock comments that 
Machiavelli’s appreciation of tension is “shocking and incredible to minds which 
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identified union with stability and virtue, conflict with innovation and decay.”128 But 
Machiavelli’s “appreciation” becomes less shocking after considering that Rome’s 
conflict allowed it to create the great empire, which has long since characterized, and 
which ultimately destroyed, the republic. In sum, in asserting that the conflict between 
the Senate and plebs created the tribunes, thus protecting Rome’s liberty and sustaining 
its power, Machiavelli holds that “good effects of good order can come from apparent 
disorder.”129  
  Having explained how Machiavelli identifies conflict as positive, it is useful to 
note that not all conflict is good in Machiavelli’s eyes. While he accepts, even applauds, 
“inevitable and productive conflict,” like that existing between the Senate and the plebs, 
he condemns other conflicts. For instance, as Bock, Skinner, and Viroli point out, in the 
Florentine Histories, “Machiavelli seems to have abandoned this positive evaluation of 
civil conflict.”130 This complicates an understanding of Machiavelli as a proponent of 
tension in politics. Examining the conflicts that he detests, however, we can begin to 
reconcile these claims that appear to conflict. First, Machiavelli condemns conflict like 
that “between rival families,” which he experienced in Florence.131 In “Civil discord in 
Machiavelli’s Istorie Fiorentine,” Geneva Bock points out that, for Machiavelli, types of 
discord like that arising between the Senate and the plebs of Rome is “natural, 
unavoidable and may even lead, if checked and handled in a civilized way, to equality 
and the common good.”132 Other types of discord, like conflict between competing 
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political families, “are merely struggles for power, are avoidable and hence should be 
avoided.”133 Bock quotes Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories, in which he argues against 
divisions of “sette [sects, factions] and partisans,” for example divisions between 
families, clans, client groups, and patronage systems.134 
 It seems that there are two principle factors that distinguish these two types of 
tension. First, inevitability – tension that is inevitable cannot be avoided, and therefore 
must be controlled and put to good use. It seems an inherent aspect of political society 
and therefore of history. And while it had its defects, it also has its rewards. The second 
factor, relating to the resolution of conflict, seems to be the presence of an institutional 
system that can house or accommodate tension. The tension existing between the Senate 
and the plebs was institutionalized within the Roman government through the creation of 
the tribunes. Therefore, while conflicts still arose between the noble and popular classes, 
they raged on within the confines of the political apparatus and the “quarrels between the 
nobles and the people in Rome were settled by discussions.”135 As such, the disunion 
between the Senate and the plebs did not threaten the political apparatus itself. In 
Florence, on the other hand, conflict ended in violence; it was not directed through formal 
political channels, through which its passions could have been put to good use. As a 
result, it threatened the political system itself.  
 The pages above have fleshed out how Machiavelli introduces tension as an 
inevitable aspect of the political, and defends its usefulness to a republic. The chapter will 
now turn to address the question of where Machiavelli sits in relation to agonal theory. 
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Modern political theorists, Leo Strauss for example, have highlighted the originality of 
Machiavelli’s position in the Discourses; Strauss labels it as a “wholly new praise of 
discord.”136 And under the entry for “Machiavelli” in the International Encyclopedia of 
Political Science, his vision of social institutions, “which suggests that popular discord 
makes society free and powerful,” is described as “agonistic” and “dynamic.”137  
Machiavelli is also regularly referenced in the work of agonal theorists. He is 
cited by Chantal Mouffe as the “first to recognize” an understanding of the political as 
“collective participation in a public sphere where interests are confronted, conflicts 
resolved, divisions exposed, confrontations staged, and in that way, liberty secured.”138 
Similarly, Mark Wenman, in his book Agonistic Democracy, notes, “indeed, we can trace 
the first explicit formulation in western political thought of the agonistic idea of the 
positive value of conflict to Machiavelli’s The Discourses, where he developed the idea 
that internal conflict can contribute to the vitality of the republic.”139As such, Machiavelli 
seems to emerge as a forefather of the agonal tradition.  
While the previous chapter pointed to agonism’s origins in the Greek agon and 
noted an appreciation of tension in Roman Stoicism, this section seeks to underscore the 
fact that Machiavelli puts forth the first explicit, formal agonal political perspective. 
Machiavelli’s appreciation of tension, however, does not solely appear in the work of 
modern agonal theorists. Rather, Machiavelli’s thoughts on tension as inevitable, and 
potentially positive, appear at various moments in the work of a number of modern 
political theorists who came after him. Therefore, this study will now turn to identifying 
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some of the other examples of an appreciation on tension within modern Western 
political thought, including moments of appreciation in the work of Montesquieu, 
Edmund Burke, J.S. Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville, after which it will note a few 
moments of opposition.   
Montesquieu 
First turning to the eighteenth century French political philosopher, we see that 
Montesquieu follows Machiavelli in displaying an appreciation of tension in his political 
thought. Scholars have remarked that Montesquieu was profoundly influenced by 
Machiavelli.140 This is apparent in Montesquieu’s remarks in Considerations on 
Greatness of the Romans and their Decline, especially his discussion on the dissensions 
of Rome. He states, 
We hear in the authors only of the dissensions that ruined 
Rome, without seeing that these dissensions were necessary 
to it, that they had always been there and always had to be. 
It was the greatness of the republic that caused all the 
trouble and changed popular tumults into civil wars. There 
had to be dissensions in Rome, for warriors who were so 
proud, so audacious, so terrible abroad could not be very 
moderate at home. To ask for men in a free state who are 
bold in war and timid in peace is to wish the impossible. 
And, as a general rule, whenever we see everyone tranquil 
in a state that calls itself a republic, we can be sure that 
liberty does not exist there.141 
 
Here we see Montesquieu not only accepting the conflict between the Senate and the 
plebs as inevitable, but also, just like Machiavelli, regarding it as necessary and 
defending it as the source of Rome’s liberty. This, Montesquieu believed, applied outside 
the case of Rome. As F.T.H. Fletcher writes in Montesquieu and English Politics, 
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“political divisions were not merely salutary, but necessary in a free state.”142 Though 
political divisions may bring about conflict and agitation, they are still desirable because, 
as Montesquieu explains in Spirit of the Laws, tranquility signifies despotism. He states, 
“as fear is the principle of despotic government, its end is tranquility; but this tranquility 
cannot be called a peace: no it is only the silence of those towns which the enemy is 
ready to invade.”143 A free society, on the other hand, will be marked by “all the passions 
being unrestrained, hatred, envy, jealousy and an ambition desire of riches and 
honors.”144 But as Montesquieu observes, “were it otherwise, the state would be in the 
condition of a man weakened by sickness, who is without passions because he is without 
strength.”145 
Montesquieu’s appreciation of conflict in politics seems to become complicated, 
however, in his lessons on the separation of powers. On the one hand, Montesquieu 
claims that power can only be checked by competing power. He makes this perfectly 
clear in Chapter XI, 4 of Spirit of the Laws, when he states, “it is necessary from the very 
nature of things that power should be a check to power.” Constitutions, according to 
Montesquieu, should be designed with this in mind – hence the separation of powers. 
Moreover, as Franz Neumann describes in his introduction to Montesquieu’s Spirit of the 
Laws, Montesquieu understood that different social groups or interests would 
characterize each of the powers. To Montesquieu, “the monarch…represented social 
interests different from those of the legislature; the legislature…was to represent the 
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aristocracy and the bourgeoisie respectively; while the judiciary…was to represent 
everybody, and hence nobody.”146 With this arrangement, it would be expected that each 
power would have a very different prerogative. However, Montesquieu states in Book XI, 
chapter 6, “these three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction. But as 
there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move, 
but still in concert.”147 Herein, it seems that the separate powers must agree, which is 
inconsistent with his appreciations of conflict and tension that were outlined above. 
There is an interpretation, however, which uncovers a sense of consistency 
throughout his thought. Perhaps what Montesquieu means by “moving in concert” is 
similar to his discussion in Considerations on “dissonance” and “harmony” as they relate 
to unity.148 In Considerations, following his contention that dissention was not the cause 
of Rome’s downfall, Montesquieu says,  
What is called union in a body politic is a very equivocal 
thing. The true kind is a union of harmony, whereby all the 
parts, however opposed they may appear, cooperate for the 
general good of society — as dissonances in music 
cooperate in producing overall concord. In a state where we 
seem to see nothing but commotion there can be union — 
that is, a harmony resulting in happiness, which alone is 
true peace.149  
 
What Montesquieu seems to be describing is what we previously observed Mouffe 
describe as agonism. Surely there is conflict, tension, disagreement, and debate in 
politics. However, it is a debate between adversaries, not enemies. Opposition operates 
                                                        
146 Neumann, Franz, “Editor’s Introduction.” The Spirit of the Laws by Baron Charles de Montesquieu.  
New York: Hafner Press/Macmillan Publishing Co., 1949, p. lviii 
147 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XI, 6 
148 It’s noteworthy that all of these are musical terms. I believe this strengthens this interpretation as these 
statements are connected through Montesquieu’s choice to use musical vocabulary in both instances.  
149Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat,baron de. Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the 
Romans and their Decline. Trans. David Lowenthal. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968, IX 
  46 
within an agreed upon institutional framework, and all opposition operates in the name of 
the good. Ultimately this produces some sort of unity. But, just as Mouffe expounds, it is 
unity in “a context of conflict and diversity.”150 Moreover, Montesquieu offers this 
dissonant concord in contrast to what he calls “the concord of Asiatic despotism,” in 
which he argues, “there is always real dissension...if we see any union there, it is not 
citizens who are united but dead bodies buried one next to the other.”151 Herein, perhaps 
what Montesquieu meant by “moving in concert,” is not that the powers must always 
necessarily be in perfect "unison,” but rather that, despite their differences, they must 
exist under agreed-upon institutions and work towards the general good of society. In 
doing this, any dissonances between them will augment the harmony of society, rather 
than threaten it. Such an interpretation allows one to discern a much more consistent, 
comprehensive appreciation of tension throughout Montesquieu’s political thought. 
Burke 
Irish born, eighteenth century British politician, Edmund Burke also appears to 
accept tension as inevitable in, and ultimately positive for politics in his appreciation of 
parties. Harvey Mansfield, in his work Statesmanship and Party Government, shares that 
in 1769 Burke commented that “party divisions are inseparable from free government.”152 
In this vein, Burke appears to acknowledge division and conflict between these groups as 
an inevitable fact of political society, and supports their subsequent placement in 
institutions of government. Burke’s recognition of division and conflict as inevitable goes 
further – for Burke, opposition was tolerable, even desirable. Parties, according to Burke, 
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are bodies of men united “for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, 
upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.”153 In working to advance 
their particular conception of the good, however, parties exist in rivalry with one another. 
Burke expresses an acceptance of such party division and rivalry. He remarks that parties 
are “on the whole operating for good.”154 Because parties are accepted within institutions 
of government, what Burke seems to be introducing is an idea of regulated rivalry. As 
explained by Nancy Rosenblum in On the Side of the Angels, “regulated rivalry simply 
says that parties can serve this basic good of nonviolent, institutionalized conflict and 
political change.”155 
Burke is especially appreciative of partisan discord in cases when the power of 
one group needs to be checked or curtailed. For Burke, the best way to prevent one 
corrupt, power-seeking group was to establish other groups in opposition. This lies 
behind his comment in “Thoughts,” which states, “when bad men combine, the good men 
must associate; else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible 
struggle.”156 For Burke, this is essential to maintain liberty. As John Plamenatz writes in 
his review of Burke’s “Thoughts” in a 1951 issue of Parliamentary Affairs,157 for Burke, 
“if freedom is to survive, there must, wherever there are parties, be more than one party, 
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and that they must, since it is their nature to strive for power, be always competing for it 
and yet never able to put an end to the competition.”158  
Burke’s praise of tension and conflict seems to go even further than his 
appreciation of partisan conflict. Burke also appreciates tension and conflict within 
government institutions themselves. In discussing the separation of powers in 
government, Burke puts forward the idea that “the common good emerges as the result of 
the interaction, perhaps the competition, of the parts of government and society.”159 As 
such, he expounds the idea that conflict and debate, rather than unity and consensus, 
between institutions of government may procure good effects for political society. 
Mill 
Nineteenth century Englishman John Stuart Mill also exhibits an appreciation of 
conflict and debate in his political thought. Primarily in his essay On Liberty, Mill 
suggests that dissent can be advantageous despite its dangers or unorthodox nature.160 
First, Mill puts forward that conflicts of opinion and debate are useful on the individual 
level. To Mill, rational opinion and conduct only come to fruition through conflict and 
debate. In his work Government by Dissent, Robert Martin outlines Mill’s thoughts on 
the value of dissent on the individual level. He points out that Mill believes that 
dissenters’ views are “on balance, productive because they make the rest of us reevaluate 
our own views, making what would otherwise be “dead dogma” into “living truth.””161 
Mill expresses this with his discussion of those who are wise. The wise, according to 
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Mill, have become wise because they accept and consider the criticism and feedback of 
other opinions. He states, “in the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving 
of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of 
his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be 
said against him.”162  
Mill extends this appreciation of conflict and debate past the individual level, 
extending it to politics generally. For Mill, in the political realm, “only through diversity 
of opinion is there…a chance of fair-play to all sides of the truth.”163 Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, Mill appreciates politics as the art of balancing opposing sides 
(as represented through parties) and maintaining a tradition of conflict. Such a tradition 
will prevent any one side, party, or perspective from growing too strong, which is vital 
for the health of the state. He writes,  
In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace that a party of 
order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are 
both necessary elements of a healthy state of political 
life…Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility 
from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great 
measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within 
the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favourable 
to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to 
equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and 
to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and 
discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of 
practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and 
enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there 
is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale 
is sure to go up and the other down.164  
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Mill remarks that maintaining a balanced tension between opposites is challenging, but, 
as emphasized above, necessary for the sake of “reason” and “sanity,” not to mention 
freedom. Herein, Mill clearly appreciates conflict as an expedient political reality, and 
defends the maintenance of a balanced tension through dissention and debate amongst 
competing parties or viewpoints.  
 
Tocqueville 
Turning to the nineteenth century, French political thinker and historian, Alexis 
de Tocqueville showcases an appreciation of tension in his thought. As stated by Eric 
Plaag in his introduction to a translation of Democracy in America, “Tocqueville’s 
Democracy remains a masterful display of insight and foresight into all things American. 
Coming from a twenty-six year-old tourist, his observations seem to display nothing short 
of pure genius.”165 Similarly, in their introduction to Democracy in America, Harvey 
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop remark, “Democracy in America is at once the best book 
ever written on democracy and the best book ever written on America.”166 This argument, 
while undeniably bold, highlights the particular usefulness of Alexis de Tocqueville to 
this chapter. Democracy in America’s contents and contribution to political science 
extend far beyond an acute analysis of the American political system; the work provides 
an equally acute analysis of democratic government generally. Tocqueville states in his 
own introduction, “I confess that, in America, I saw more than America; I sought there 
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the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character its prejudices, and its 
passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its progress.”167  
While much of Tocqueville’s commentary on democracy has been studied 
extensively, one of his significant contributions seems to have received less attention – 
the role of tension in liberal democratic politics. It is this, often overlooked, contribution 
that this study is most concerned with. Throughout Tocqueville’s work in Democracy in 
America, one can identify tension’s role in politics as it plays out in broader democratic 
theory, and then focus in more narrowly, examining how tension fits into American 
democracy specifically. The latter examination is one the next chapter will undertake.  
Tocqueville accommodates more than one single tension within his political 
theory, but the principle tension that he discusses is that which exists between equality 
and liberty. Tocqueville opens Democracy in America by establishing an equality of 
conditions as the fundamental fact of American democracy. But he pushes this further, 
claiming that there is a worldwide trend towards such an equality of conditions and 
towards democratic institutions as well. For Tocqueville, this social phenomenon has 
political implications; after all, “it is impossible to believe that equality will not 
eventually find its way to the political world, as it does everywhere else.”168 Just as men 
are socially equal, they are to be politically equal as well. As such, Tocqueville identifies 
equality as the idol of democratic nations. He remarks, “nothing can satisfy them without 
equality, and they would rather perish than lose it.”169 Tocqueville points out, however, 
that while equality may be democratic nations’ first love, it is hardly their only. “On the 
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contrary, they have an instinctive love of [liberty].”170 But liberty, or as Tocqueville often 
refers to it, freedom, is a principle value of democracy, it is not “the distinguishing 
characteristic of democratic ages.”171  
According to Tocqueville, democracy is best maintained when equality and 
liberty are properly balanced.  In part II, chapter 1, of the second volume of Democracy 
in America Tocqueville remarks,  
It is possible to imagine an extreme point at which freedom 
and equality would meet and be confounded together. Let us 
suppose that all the members of the community take a part 
in the government, and that each of them has an equal right 
to take a part in it.  As none is different from his fellows, 
none can exercise a tyrannical power: men will be 
completely free, because they are entirely equal; and they 
will all be perfectly equal, because they are entirely free. To 
this ideal state democratic nations tend.172 
 
But he continues,  
 
Equality, pushed to its furthest extent, may be confounded 
with freedom, yet there is good reason for distinguishing 
the one from the other. The taste which men have for 
liberty, and that which they feel for equality, are, in fact, 
two different things.173  
 
As Tocqueville sees it, equality and liberty do not always lend themselves to one 
another. Rather, “equality awakens in men several propensities extremely dangerous to 
freedom.”174  First, Tocqueville comments that equality leads those within a democracy 
to have contempt for “forms.”  To those focused on equality, forms – comparable to 
modern social norms or manners – reak of aristocracy. However, Tocqueville argues that 
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forms are essential to freedom. Forms perpetually serve as a retardant, a sedative. 
According to Tocqueville, this “is the very thing which renders forms so useful to 
freedom: for their chief merit is to serve as a barrier between the strong and the weak, the 
ruler and the people, to retard the one, and give the other time to look about him.”175 
Second, Tocqueville asserts that in their commitment to equality, a democratic people 
will often undervalue the rights of private persons. He states that because they are 
relatively new rights, and, historically, have not been significant, “the rights of private 
persons amongst democratic nations are… often sacrificed without regret, and almost 
always violated without remorse.”176 Cumulatively, his warnings echo a statement he 
makes in Volume I of Democracy in America, in which he observes, “in a state where the 
citizens are all nearly equal, it becomes difficult for them to preserve their independence 
against the aggressions of power. No one among them being strong enough to engage in 
the struggle alone with advantage, nothing but a general combination can protect their 
liberty.”177 Herein, achieving universal equality can, at times, directly threaten liberty. 
When this happens, a substantial, unified effort would be required to safeguard liberty. 
But, as Tocqueville points out, “such a union is not always possible.”178 And although 
Tocqueville does not take the same care to explore how liberty may infringe upon 
equality, one can imagine several instances in which this may happen. Thus, for 
Tocqueville, properly constituted democracy is conflicted at its core.  
The paradox between equality and liberty is not, however, Tocqueville’s primary 
fear for democracy. Rather, Tocqueville’s principal concern is that in attempting to 
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resolve this tension in favor of equality, democratic nations will descend into despotism. 
Specifically, Tocqueville fears what he calls a “soft despotism.” In contrast to his 
depiction of a ‘healthy democracy’, characterized by action and contest, Tocqueville 
paints despotism as a relatively tranquil political state.  As Paul Rahe examines in Soft 
Despotism, Democracy’s Drift, the despotism that Tocqueville anticipates “would be 
more extensive and gentler or softer, and it would degrade men without tormenting 
them.”179 Tocqueville’s in-depth description of such despotism is as follows – 
an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly 
endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut 
their lives. Each of them, living apart, is a stranger to the fate of all the rest 
– his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of 
mankind; as for the as for the rest of his fellow-citizens…he exists but in 
himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he 
may be said at any rate to have lost his country. Above him stands an 
immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their 
gratifications, and to watch over their fate, that power is absolute, minute, 
regular, provident, and mild…it seeks…to keep them in perpetual 
childhood; it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they 
think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government 
labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that 
happiness: it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their 
necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, 
directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides 
their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking 
and all the trouble of living? Thus, it everyday renders the exercise of the 
free agency of man less and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within 
a narrower range, and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The 
principle of equality has prepared men for these things; it has predisposed 
men to endure them, and oftentimes to look on them as benefits. After 
having thus successively taken each member of the community in its 
powerful grasp, and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then 
extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society 
with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through 
which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot 
penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but 
softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are 
constantly restrained from acting: such a power does not destroy, but it 
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prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses; enervates, 
extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to be 
nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the 
government is the shepherd. 180  
 
Ultimately, Tocqueville finds that such a despotism “often promises to make 
amends for a thousand previous ills; it supports the right, it protects the oppressed, and it 
maintains public order. The nation is lulled by the temporary prosperity which it 
produced.”181 On the other hand, the maintenance of a balanced tension between equality 
and liberty is generally established with difficulty in the midst of storms; it is perfected 
by civil discord.”182 Therefore, a balanced relationship between equality and liberty is not 
easily achieved or maintained; it will not be comfortable or smooth. However, 
Tocqueville’s description of “soft despotism” emphasizes that even more dangerous than 
the perils of conflicts between equality and liberty, is the irradiation of the tension 
between these two principles of democracy.  Tocqueville hopes that democratic nations 
can procure and maintain a balance between these two, at times contradictory, political 
tenets.  As Aurelian Craiutu points out in his article, “Tocqueville’s Paradoxical 
Moderation,” “Tocqueville believed that democracy is inherently unstable and dangerous 
not so much because it is predicated on a constant tension between equality and liberty 
but because most people would seek to solve this tension in favor of equality by 
abandoning liberty.”183  
 The following comments were also put forward in the previous chapter, but they 
are worth mentioning again: Tocqueville’s discussion on equality and liberty and Chantal 
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Mouffe’s “democratic paradox” are strikingly similar. Indeed, it seems very odd that 
Mouffe does not quote, or even cite, Tocqueville once. After all, Tocqueville really 
seems to present the exact idea that Mouffe argues for in The Democratic Paradox: that 
liberal-democracy is not “the search for an inaccessible consensus, but an agonistic 
confrontation of the constitutive liberal-democratic values”184 – i.e., equality and liberty. 
Having fleshed out Tocqueville’s thoughts on the relationship between equality 
and liberty in democracy, it is clear that Tocqueville saw the utility of tension for politics, 
and seems to incorporate an aspect of agonal theory in his democratic thought. His 
accommodation of tension, however, is not limited to the relationship between equality 
and liberty. Tocqueville also saw tension’s benefits for democracy in the conflicts arising 
from pluralism, namely in its ability to protect against the tyranny of the majority. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, in The Return of the Political, Chantal Mouffe states, 
“a healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political positions and the open 
conflict of interests.”185 The following paragraphs will emphasize that Tocqueville would 
have been inclined to agree.  
First, Tocqueville regards conflicting interests as inevitable in great democratic 
nations. Democracy facilitates the existence of a wide-array of political opinions and 
perspectives. Moreover, Tocqueville acknowledged the propensity for people to join 
together with like-minded individuals. In the process of associating, the shared opinions 
that brought people together in the first place will often intensify and a sort of crowd 
effect seems to be in place –  
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the intensity of human passions is heightened not only by 
the importance of the end which they propose to attain, but 
by the multitude of individuals who are animated by them, 
at the same time. Everyone has had occasion to remark, that 
his emotions in the midst of a sympathizing crowd are far 
greater than those which he would have felt in solitude.186 
 
People are inclined to associate with those who profess the same opinion. And as 
democracy tolerates and breeds a multiplicity of political opinions, it will accept and 
encourage an abundance of political associations. Tocqueville defines an association as a 
“public assent which a number of individuals give to certain doctrines; and in the 
engagement which they contract to promote in a certain manner the spread of those 
doctrines.”187 Associations are useful political tools as they unite and focus the efforts of 
individuals, helping them to achieve an end which they mutually desire.  
 The unlimited right to association, however, has consequences, namely that 
conflicting and competing associations will inevitably arise. In a free country with an 
open right of association, “all is bustle and activity…amelioration and progress are the 
topics of inquiry.”188 And while Tocqueville recognizes the convulsions that this will 
produce, he accepts them as necessary for the maintenance of democracy. Tocqueville 
asserts that fierce opposition among political associations “has become a necessary 
guaranty against the tyranny of the majority.”189 Therefore, while the tension existing 
between political associations, at worst, threatens to “throw [a] nation into anarchy,” or at 
least “perpetually augments the chances of that calamity,”190 it is integral for the health of 
democratic government. Tocqueville comments, “a dangerous expedient is used to 
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obviate a still more formidable danger,” that danger being the despotism of a faction or 
solitary ruler.191 As Craiutu points out, “Tocqueville realized that if any one set of 
interests at work in society were ever allowed to reign absolutely over its rivals, the 
competition between them would come to an end and society would be deprived of one 
of its leading principles of social improvement.”192 It is the tension between competing 
interests that allows for the advancement of democratic society. Craiutu summarizes 
Tocqueville’s point well:  
Social and moral progress would become impossible, 
because society would lack the necessary pluralism that 
makes political freedom possible…in order to survive and 
flourish, democratic societies must cultivate a systematic 
antagonism by creating the necessary conditions for a free 
competition for power between rival ideas, principles, 
forces, modes of life, and interests.193  
 
 Exploring his commentary on the relationship between equality and liberty, as 
well as his defense of pluralism, it becomes obvious that Tocqueville admires, or at least 
respects, the inevitable presence and, moreover, the potential usefulness of tension within 
democracies. Towards the end of his chapter in Volume I of Democracy in America 
entitled, “Advantages of Democracy,” he admits the disadvantages that democracy may 
incur because of its paradoxical, conflict-ridden, existence. Tocqueville states, 
“Democratic liberty is far from accomplishing all its projects with the skill of an adroit 
despotism. It frequently abandons them before they have home their fruits, or risks them 
when the consequences may be dangerous.”194 But he justifies this: 
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in the end, it produces more than any absolute 
government…[Democracy] produces what the ablest 
governments are frequently unable to create; namely, an 
all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force, 
and an energy which is inseparable from it, and which may, 
however unfavorable circumstances may be, produce 
wonders.195  
 
 Finally, Tocqueville’s appreciation of conflict and tension is evident in his ideas 
on moderation. Tocqueville rejects any benefits of moderation characterized by  
mass floating in the middle, inert, egotistic, without energy 
without patriotism, sensual, sybaritic, that has only 
instincts, that lives from day to day, that becomes in turn 
the plaything of all the others. Moderation without virtue 
nor courage; moderation that is born from cowardice of the 
heart and not from virtue, from exhaustion, from fear, from 
egoism; tranquility that does not come about because you 
are well-off, but because you do not have the courage and 
the energy necessary to seek something better. Debasement 
of souls. The passions of old men that end in impotence.196  
 
Here we see that moderation, for Tocqueville, should be avoided, unless it is an 
immoderate moderation, characterized by paradox and contradiction, like the moderation 
he himself seems to exhibit. Throughout his political thought, as detailed by Craiutu, 
“Tocqueville speaks…without offering a rigid doctrine.”197 In fact, Tocqueville’s thought 
seems, at times, inconsistent, even contradictory. Craiutu continues, “On one hand he is 
liberal, on another conservative. He seems to adore democracy, but occasionally he 
ardently defends aristocracy. Even for those who find him to be moderate, his moderation 
is found to immoderately composed.”198 Thus, as Craiutu has aptly pointed out, it seems 
that Tocqueville himself heeded the advice he gave to democracies; his work and his 
political thought exhibit the same sorts of tension, conflict, even paradox, that he 
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identifies in democracy. Herein, if one identifies Tocqueville as a “moderate,” they must 
accept him as an agonistic one. 
 To summarize, Tocqueville’s comments on the paradoxical relationship between 
equality and liberty, on the need for a multiplicity of opinions, and on moderation all 
emphasize how he accommodates and incorporates tension and conflict in his political 
thought. In this vein, he follows Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Burke, and Mill in exhibiting 
some of the central tenets of modern agonal theory in his political thought.  
 While each of the last five examples have emphasized the pervasiveness of the 
characteristic elements of agonal theory within and throughout modern political thought, 
there are also moments of significant opposition to agonal ideas in the work of other 
modern political thinkers. Therefore, while the task of this chapter is to note how the 
principles of agonal theory are appreciated throughout modern political thought, it is 
important to observe that such an appreciation is not universal. There are a number of 
modern theorists who do not accommodate, much less appreciate, notions of conflict or 
tension within their political thought, as the following paragraphs on Thomas Hobbes, J.J. 
Rousseau, and Woodrow Wilson will show.  
Hobbes 
The work of seventeenth century English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, 
clearly marks a moment of opposition to agonal ideas in modern political thought. 
Hobbes explicitly rejects pluralism and, therefore, any positive conception of tension as 
well. In his famous Leviathan, Hobbes constructs an absolutely powerful sovereign. This 
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sovereign is created when men join the social contract, conferring “all of their power and 
strength upon one man”199 to escape the State of Nature. The resulting sovereign is “one 
person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have 
made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of 
them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense.”200 Once it is 
established through the social contract, this Leviathan, according to Hobbes, exists to 
preserve the commonwealth by preventing civil disunion and opposition, which he sees 
as likely to produce civil war. The absolute sovereign will “defend [men] from … the 
injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as… they may nourish 
themselves and live contentedly.”201 Herein, Hobbes creates his particular escape from 
the state of nature precisely in an effort to avoid disunion and the conflict it precipitates. 
Similarly, Hobbes rejects the viability of the separation of powers. In his chapter entitled 
“Of Those Things that Weaken, or Tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth,” Hobbes 
states, “what is it to divide the power of a Commonwealth, but to dissolve it; for powers 
divided mutually destroy each other.”202 Therefore, Hobbes clearly rejects pluralism, and 
rejects tension, including tension between powers of government, even more strongly. As 
Rosenblum explains, “Hobbes’ is a theory of sovereign absolutism in the service of a 
stable whole.”203 Hobbes does not accommodate any form of agonal theory in his 
political philosophy and represents an obvious moment of opposition to agonism in 
modern political thought. 
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Rousseau 
 
Writing in 18th century France, republican Jean-Jacques Rousseau also presents a 
perspective that does not accommodate any sort of pluralism or tension. His work, 
therefore, clearly opposes agonal ideas. First, Rousseau “opposed any political 
recognition of parts.”204 For Rousseau, only the whole is sovereign. In A Discourse on the 
Origins of Inequality, Rousseau makes a point of saying that authority is derived from 
civil society, rather than the other way around. This idea, garnered on the notion of 
consent, is furthered in his Social Contract. In joining the social contract each man freely 
“unites himself with all” on the following terms --  
each of us puts his person and all his power in common 
under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our 
corporate capacity we receive each member as an 
indivisible  part of the whole.205 
 
We see here that Rousseau aimed his political theory at unity. Conversely, for Rousseau, 
pluralism is an abomination. This is evident in book IV of The Social Contract, where 
Rousseau states, “when particular interest begin to make themselves felt and sectional 
societies begin to exert an influence…the common interest becomes corrupted.”206 
Therefore, as Rosenblum points out in her analysis of Rousseau, “unanimity is not just an 
ideal but the supreme premise of Rousseau’s republicanism.”207 In rejecting pluralism, 
Rousseau inherently rejects tension. The general will does not accommodate competition 
between opinions or interests. Instead, it singles out one singular, commonly held opinion 
and pushes that forward, coercing all to support it in executing their commitment to the 
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social contract. Rousseau’s twofold rejection of pluralism and tension highlights the fact 
that his political theory is opposed to any notion of agonism. 
Wilson 
 
Finally, turning to a more contemporary example, American President Woodrow 
Wilson provides an additional moment of opposition to agonal theory in modern political 
thought. Wilson preaches an art of politics that discards the diversity of ideas and works 
to unify the public towards one particular vision. In fact, Wilson rejects the 
government’s, as well as the people’s, ability to accommodate tension. As such, he 
objects to the thinking of the Founding Fathers. (As the next chapter will assert, the 
Founding Father’s did accommodate, and actually appreciate, tension within their 
political thought and fashioned the American polity with this in mind.) Wilson claims 
that “the trouble with the [Federalist] theory is that government is not a machine, but a 
living thing…accountable to Darwin, not to Newton…No living thing can have its organs 
offset against each other as checks, and live.”208 Wilson’s progressivism, therefore, 
attempted to function for unity, which he believed he could find by being concerned with 
the “common” or “average” man. As W.J. Coats outlines in his chapter on Wilson in 
Statesmanship,  
what we can see, then, in the achievements of Woodrow 
Wilson and the progressive movement, is the public 
endorsement and codification of the incipient changes in 
customs and manners (away from independent judgment) 
described by Cooper in 1838: the citizen of the U.S. 
democratic system is no longer to attempt to preserve the 
internal tension which arises in weighing his needs against 
those of the public authority and the common good.209 
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Herein, Wilson seeks to take tension out of politics, emphasizing that Wilson exhibits 
another moment of opposition to agonal ideas within modern political thought.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has detailed five moments of appreciation of agonal ideas from the 
first formal appreciation of political tension, in the 16th century, in Machiavelli’s 
Discourses on Livy, through his contemporaries, Montesquieu, Burke, Mill and 
Tocqueville, along with three moments of opposition in the thought of Hobbes, 
Rousseau, and President Woodrow Wilson. These efforts have emphasized that agonal 
theory, though not universally accepted and expounded, can be identified within modern 
Western political thought. From this point, this study will turn to its examination of one 
final moment of appreciation. 
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CHAPTER III 
Agonistic Democracy in the United States of America 
 
“America historically has achieved the ultimate stability of 
an arch: those very forces which are logically calculated to 
drag stones to the ground actually provide props of support 
– derived from a principle in which thrust and counter-
thrust become means of counterpoise.” 
–Michael Kammen, People of Paradox 
 
Having explored agonism, defining it, discussing its origins, and highlighting both 
the moments where its central ideas are tangible in the thought of mainstream modern 
political theorists, as well as a few moments where they are criticized, this study now 
turns to its final assertion – that conflict and tension lay at the heart of the American 
polity. Pushing this point further, it will argue that the way in which the American system 
accommodates, institutionalizes and appreciates tension, renders the American 
experiment in democracy to be, more specifically, an experiment in agonistic democracy.  
As a refresher, most basically, agonism is marked by two main tenets: first, 
agonism acknowledges and accepts tension and conflict as inevitable facts of pluralist 
society. Second, agonism defends this tension and conflict as necessary, even positive, 
for the maintenance of democracy. This section will, therefore, take the time to defend 
the view that pluralism, and the dissension and debate that arise from pluralism, are, and 
historically have been, understood as inevitable to American democracy since its 
founding. The chapter will then identify how tension has been institutionalized within, 
and encouraged by, the American political system for the sake of maintaining popular 
government in the United States, and, as such, how it manifests in the modern American 
polity. 
  66 
As stated in the earlier chapter on agonism, I am defining pluralism most basically 
to mean the existence, recognition, and toleration of unique, distinguishable parts that 
exist within a political society. The statement that American democracy is a pluralist 
democracy is something I’ve never had to defend. It has always been a given, something 
stated, but never cited – a hallmark of American democracy. But, for the sake of this 
project, I believe defending pluralism as an inherent aspect of American political society 
is worthwhile.  
Nancy Rosenblum, in On The Side Of The Angels, explains that under pluralism, 
social and political parts are considered legitimate and are incorporated into the system of 
government. “Pluralism is an admitted fact of social life.”210 Moreover, as was mentioned 
in an earlier chapter, democratic forms of government permit and promote pluralism. 
Chantal Mouffe states in The Democratic Paradox, “pluralism of interests and values 
ha[s] to be acknowledged as coextensive with the very idea of ‘the people.’”211 
Democracy, or government by “the people”, is characterized by such a pluralism of 
interests and values, which manifest in a multitude of unique, distinguishable groups, 
associations, and parts.  
But American democracy, specifically, has acknowledged and accepted pluralism 
as implicit to its form. Modern scholars are quick to note the pluralistic quality of 
American society. In his book, People of Paradox, Michael Kammen argues, “unstable 
pluralism on a scale of unprecedented proportion is especially American.”212 Truthfully, 
one need look no further than the Seal of the United States or the tail-side of a new 
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penny, where “E Pluribus Unum” is written, to see proof that pluralism is central to the 
American polity. E Pluribus Unum means “out of many, one,” and represents the idea 
that our one country is composed of many unique parts, that the American Union exists in 
the context of pluralist society.  
This acknowledgement and acceptance of pluralism can be easily traced back to 
the founding of the nation. Turning to what is viewed as one of the most informative 
authorities on the thought of the American founders, the Federalist Papers (and 
Federalist 10 and Federalist 51, in particular), we see that that the Founding Fathers 
viewed pluralism, and conflict as a result, to be inevitable truths of liberal democratic 
politics, and thereby central to American society. In the famous Federalist 10, Madison 
states, “as long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, 
different opinions will be formed…the diversity in the faculties of men…is not less an 
insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests.”213 Madison recognizes that “a division 
of the society into different interests and parties”214 is inevitable. It is inevitable because 
it is inherent to mankind. Madison writes, “the latent causes of faction are thus sown in 
the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, 
according to the different circumstances of civil society.”215 And in Federalist 51, 
Madison identifies pluralism in the United States specifically. American society, he 
states, “will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens.”216  
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Having recognized pluralism as inherent to democratic society generally, and 
American society specifically, the Founders understood that conflict, tension, and 
dissension, will naturally follow. As Madison articulately outlines in Federalist 10, 
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, 
concerning government, and many other points, as well of 
speculation as of practice; an attachment to different 
leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and 
power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes 
have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, 
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual 
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex 
and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common 
good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into 
mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion 
presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions 
have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and 
excite their most violent conflicts.217  
 
At this point, it takes little effort to recognize that James Madison, the father of the 
American Constitution, has outlined the first tenants of agonal theory – that pluralism is 
inherent to democratic political society and that conflict and tension will manifest 
themselves within politics as a result.  
The American political system that Madison and the other Founding Fathers 
fashioned was designed with the fact of pluralism in mind. The Founders believed that 
pluralism produced the “violent conflicts” and “unfriendly passions” of faction, but they 
also believed that the causes of faction could not be removed. As Madison outlines, 
faction could only be removed through two options. The first option would be to 
extinguish liberty, as “liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment, without which it 
instantly expires.”218 But as liberty is essential to political life in a democratic state, this 
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is a nonviable option. The second recourse, to quell faction, would be to implement 
uniformity. Madison explains this as “giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same 
passions, and the same interests.”219  But he establishes this as virtually impossible, given 
the aforementioned reality of pluralism. It was in this vein that the founders established 
that “the causes of faction cannot be removed.”220  
As such, in shaping the American polity, the Founders were concerned with 
“controlling the effects”221—the conflict, tension, and dissention – of the faction that 
results from pluralistic democracy, rather than removing them. While the Founding 
Fathers recognized that the “violent conflicts” that faction produces might “clog the 
administration” or “convulse the society,” they understood their purpose.222 As Madison 
states in Federalist 51, security for both civil and religious rights consists in “the 
multiplicity of interests, and in the …multiplicity of sects.”223 The greater the number of 
interests and sects, the greater the security afforded to liberty. Pluralism’s removal, on the 
other hand, would likely threaten the public good, private rights, or the spirit and form of 
popular government; it would signify that a “tyranny of the majority” had come to 
fruition.224 Yet, as Madison explains, a removal of pluralism and the multiplicity of 
interests is unlikely. After all, “the extended republic of the United States” embraces a 
“great variety of interests, parties, and sects.”225  
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At this point one can begin to see that tension and the conflict of interests were 
regarded as necessary, rather than detrimental, for the protection and maintenance of the 
American republic, a system centered on popular government and committed to both 
private rights and the public good. Understanding this allows one to more fully appreciate 
the significance behind the statement of Federalist 51 that “ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition.” Every aspect of the American apparatus of government seems to 
have been designed with this idea in mind.  
Additionally, the Founding Fathers accepted that tension and conflict could 
actually be remarkably positive. In The People of Paradox, Michael Kammen points out 
that upon accepting the speakership of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1734, John 
Randolph remarked “that counterpointed opinions were necessary and ‘of all things the 
most useful.’…Because ‘then we shall hear one another patiently, put the Weight of 
every Man’s Reason in the Balance against our own, and at last form a Judgment upon 
the whole matter.’”226 Another example readily comes to mind. In a letter to Madison, 
Thomas Jefferson famously stated that under democracy men enjoy liberty and 
happiness, but he also explains that democratic government is laden with tension and 
conflict. However, while he acknowledges tension as the inevitable negative product of 
democracy, he recognizes and fleshes out how it can actually be quite beneficial. He 
states,  
It has its evils too: the principal of which is the turbulence 
to which it is subject…Malo periculosam, libertatem quam 
quietam servitutem. Even this evil is productive of good. It 
prevents the degeneracy of government, and nourishes a 
general attention to the public affairs. I hold it that a little 
rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in 
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the political world as storms in the physical. Unsuccessful 
rebellions indeed generally establish the encroachments on 
the rights of the people which have produced them. An 
observation of this truth should render honest republican 
governors so mild in their punishment of rebellions, as not 
to discourage them too much. It is a medicine necessary for 
the sound health of government."227 
 
Jefferson accepts tension and conflict as an inevitable “evils” of democratic government. 
But “even this evil is productive of good.”228 Tension, and ensuing conflicts, what 
Jefferson calls “turbulence,” will check government’s power over the people who 
constitute it, prevent encroachments of civil rights and liberties, and will ensure that 
citizens stay involved in public affairs, all of which are necessary for the maintenance of 
liberal democracy.  
Madison, Randolph, and Jefferson, along with the Founding Generation as a 
whole, seem to have recognized and put forward the second major tenet of agonism – that 
tension is necessary and positive for the maintenance of democracy. And it is my main 
assertion that they fashioned the American polity in a form that permitted, 
institutionalized, and at times even fostered tension with this conviction in mind. As 
Richard Hofstadter states in The American Political Tradition that the founding fathers 
assumed a “Hobbesian war of each against all,”229  in which society was characterized by 
tension between competing and clashing interests. However, “they did not propose to put 
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an end to this war, but merely to stabilize it and make it less murderous.”230 In this effort, 
tension, and dissension were thoroughly woven into the fabric of the American polity, 
and remain there to this day. Having arrived at this point, the chapter will now turn to 
uncovering how and where tension manifests within the American polity, focusing 
primarily on its countervailing institutions, its vibrant partisan and interest group politics, 
its dualistic principles, and the paradoxical character of American citizens and statesmen.  
Institutions of Government 
The first and most obvious place in which one can identify tension in the 
American polity is in its celebrated institutions of government. Tension can be identified 
in the system of federalism and in the separation of powers that characterize the structure 
of the Federal government. I assert that these institutions of the American polity were 
fashioned, and now function, with a profound understanding of the inevitability of 
conflict and tension among interests, and the beneficial potential of such conflict and 
tension. These institutions highlight that the American political system takes to heart that 
“where counterpointed tendencies were inevitable, both society and polity could benefit 
from healthy tensions embodied in a natural system of checks and balances.”231  
First, the system of federalism emphasizes an accommodation and appreciation of 
tension within American political institutions. Federalism, as pointed out by Tocqueville, 
is at its core a system of rivalry. The Constitution of 1789 devised a system that divided 
sovereignty in a “complex and difficult”232 manner. The arrangement, in which “each of 
the States which had composed the Union should continue to govern itself in all that 
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concerned its internal prosperity, whilst the entire nation, represented by the Union, 
should continue to form a compact body, and to provide for all general exigencies,” was 
implemented as a “middle course… which brought together by force two systems 
theoretically irreconcilable.”233  
Tocqueville details that during the establishment of the Federal Constitution two 
opinions pervaded – one proposed a congress, or a league of independent states; the other 
advocated the union of the citizens of the colonies into one people, and established one 
government that would act as the sole representative of the whole nation. The system of 
federalism is the compromise struck between these opposing opinions, one that forced 
these two competing interests together, sustaining them in a manageable tension, rather 
than finding either interest to truly dominate or forming a precise mean between them. 
This is evident in Madison’s words on federalism at the end of Federalist 39 –  
The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when tested by 
the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, 
neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a 
composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not 
national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of 
the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly 
national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not 
federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not 
national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of 
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor 
wholly national.234 
 
Therefore, as Tocqueville states, under federalism, “two sovereignties are necessarily in 
presence of each other,”235 that of the States and that of the national government. They 
will inevitably collide and conflict over their appropriate areas of jurisdiction and 
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authority. (In fact, Tocqueville sees these contests as one of the principal reasons for 
creating the Supreme Court, as one of its duties is “to maintain the balance of power 
between the two rival governments, as it had been established by the constitution.”236)  
But despite this unavoidable conflict, the contentious arrangement established by 
the system of federalism “has not hitherto produced those evils which might have been 
feared.”237 Obviously, how the system has precisely worked has shifted over the years, as 
seen through shifts between what political scientists label as dual, “layer-cake,” 
federalism and cooperative, “marble-cake,” federalism. However, this only further 
emphasizes how the system of federalism institutionalizes the tension between state and 
national interests, and makes it navigable, which, in turn, helps maintain and stabilize 
American democracy.  
Second, the structure of the Federal government also emphasizes that tension is 
accommodated and appreciated within the institutions of American democracy. Through 
the separation of powers, and the checks and balances of the government’s tripartite 
structure, tension and conflict inevitably arise between the branches of the federal 
government. In addition, tension can be identified within the branches themselves – 
especially the legislative branch, although perhaps the judicial branch to a lesser degree 
as well. The following paragraphs will explain both of these statements in order to 
underscore how an accommodation and appreciation of tension is central to the structure 
and institutions of American government.  
Madison opens Federalist 51 by explaining the purpose behind the separation of 
powers. He states, “by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its 
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several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each 
other in their proper places,”238 an appropriate distribution of power may be maintained. 
The Founders “feared concentration of powers in a single branch.”239 Moreover, they 
were concerned that federal power would become too strong and would come to infringe 
on individual liberties. The Constitution, therefore, was designed so that each branch – 
the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary – would have “a will of its own”240 and 
that the will of each would thwart that of the others. One can identify the origins of the 
branches’ wills in the Constitution's Articles I, II, and III which outline each branch’s 
specific powers. Through this system of rivalry, not only would one branch be prevented 
from growing too strong, but the entire government would be reined in so that it did not 
infringe on the liberty of the people. Ultimately, therefore, what the Founders sought to 
do was to place internal checks on government and its power for an appropriate balance 
of power and the maintenance of liberty under American democracy. Tension and 
conflict between the branches constituted such a check.  
But how do these tensions actually manifest? All legislative powers are granted to 
the United States Congress in Article I of the Constitution; as outlined by Article II, 
executive powers go to the President; Article III specifies that judicial powers are 
reserved for the Supreme Court, and the judicial system under it. This formal distribution 
of power and authority make the three branches seem very distinct. However, the authors 
of the Constitution also included a significant number of checks through which the 
branches inhibit each other’s primary function. Through these the branches begin to 
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collide. Examples include the President’s ability to veto legislation, Congress’ ability to 
override such a veto, the requirement, under Article II, Section 2, of Senate advice and 
consent of Presidential appointments, Senate ratification of treaties, the Judiciary’s ability 
to strike down laws as unconstitutional, Congress’ ability to put forward new 
constitutional amendments, the list continues. What all of these emphasize is that, while 
the branches are distinct, they do not operate in isolation; the Constitution makes that 
impossible. And it is in these constitutionally established contact zones, where the 
branches interact, that tension manifests.241  
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville notes the tension that arises through the 
separation of powers. He explains that the different branches of the federal government, 
namely the legislature and the executive are often at odds. For instance, later in the 
chapter, “The Federal Constitution,” in discussing the role of the Supreme Court, 
Tocqueville remarks that “the executive” will turn to the Courts “for assistance against 
the encroachments of the legislative power,” and the “Legislature demands” the Court’s 
“protection against the assaults of the Executive.”242 A modern example may help to 
emphasize how tension arises between branches. The 2014 Supreme Court case National 
Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ___ (2014) was, most basically, a 
dispute between the legislative and executive branches. In this particular case, Congress 
and the President were at odds over the President’s power to make recess appointments. 
President Obama made four appointments during the 2011-2012 Holiday recess, claiming 
his authority to do so under the recess appointments clause. Congress, Senate 
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Republicans in particular, held that President Obama had exceeded the constitutional 
authority given to him under the recess appointments clause, as the appointments were 
made while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions every three days (most likely in 
an effort to prevent the President making any recess appointments). Therefore, while the 
case involved a much more complex and intricate set of facts, it was, at its core, really 
about friction between the legislative and executive branches. As Justice Scalia stated in 
his concurring opinion, “this issue has been the subject of a long-simmering inter-branch 
conflict.”243  
Ultimately, as Epstein and Walker assert in their chapter on the separation of 
powers in Constitutional Law for a Changing America, the Framers structured the federal 
government to achieve some sort of balanced government through the friction between 
the three branches of government. However, the conflicts and struggles for power 
between branches all occur within in the constitutional framework, an agreed upon 
system and set of procedures. As such, the multitude of checks and balances between the 
branches allow conflict to wage on within the Federal government without threatening to 
dissolve it altogether. I believe this arrangement seems quite akin to Chantal Mouffe’s 
statement in The Democratic Paradox that, under agonal theory, conflict should only 
“take place within a social framework that allows those in conflict to envision themselves 
as part of a shared order, even as they are encouraged to contest this same order. Thus 
conflict “needs to take a form that does not destroy the political association.””244 Under 
the arrangement of the separation of powers, the three branches of the U.S. federal 
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government all exist within an agreed upon social framework. But, as evidenced by the 
NLRB v. Noel Canning case, they continually debate and contest this order.  
Tension is not only tangible among the branches, but within the branches as well. 
For instance, tension is evident within the legislative branch, between the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. As Michael Kammen outlines in People of Paradox, “The 
Founders created a bicameral body so that it would expressly embrace contradictions. 
The House was dedicated to the propositions of majority rule, and the Senate to the 
sacredness of minority rights.”245 The Senate was composed to favor the principle of the 
independence of the states, as each state was allotted two representatives, regardless of 
population or size. The House, on the other hand, was formed with the sovereignty of the 
whole nation in mind, as representation in that chamber is proportional to population. 
And, as Alexis de Tocqueville states in Democracy in America, given this inconsistency, 
“the minority of the nation in the Senate may paralyze the decisions of the majority 
represented in the other House,”246 emphasizing that relations between the two chambers 
may not always be harmonious.  
Similar statements about discord could be made regarding the judicial branch. The 
Supreme Court is not composed of nine identically thinking jurors. Instead, its members, 
its operations, and even its decisions are marked by difference, dissension, and debate. 
Similarly, if one looks beyond the Supreme Court, at the judiciary as a whole, there is 
hardly unanimity. For instance, there was incredible division among lower court rulings 
on “gay marriage” up until 2014, division that highlights that tension and dissension are 
evident within the judicial branch. Additionally, the fact that the judiciary has the means 
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to alleviate this tension – an ultimate decision from the Supreme Court – does not mean 
that the tension among divergent rulings, various legal arguments, or conflicting 
philosophies of constitutional interpretation, is permanently quelled. It simply indicates 
that the multitude of conflicting legal opinions within the United States exist within a set 
framework to which they all agree implicitly. Their discord is institutionalized, but it is 
discord nonetheless.  Obviously, the executive branch does not exhibit internal tensions 
to the same extent as the legislative or judicial branch. But this is to be expected, as the 
Executive Branch is under the more unilateral authority of the President. 
Having emphasized that tension exists both among the three branches of the 
federal government, and within the legislative and judicial branches themselves, it can be 
logically concluded that, ultimately, these tensions are beneficial for American 
government on the whole. The presence of tension among and within the branches 
indicates that a multiplicity of interests is present in government, that no one branch, 
chamber, party, group, or person, dominate, and, therefore, that power is not overly 
consolidated and abused. Further, it may help to prevent the subjugation of individual 
freedoms to federal authority.  
Additionally, sustained tension among and within the branches of government 
gives the federal government an adaptable nature; the constant “back and forth” allows 
for the balance of power to shift, provided that this is accomplished within an agreed 
upon framework. For instance, as history suggests, at times when national security seems 
threatened, power may pull in the direction of the President and his executive branch. In 
times of peace, however, the legislative branch may fight to reclaim power and authority. 
At the same time as they make it adaptable, the tensions that are central to the structure 
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and organization of American government can prevent such changes from happening too 
quickly, too rashly, or too permanently. Again, as Madison explained in Federalist 51, 
“the several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping 
each other in their proper places.”247 Therefore, the tensions produced by the separation 
of powers, which characterize the federal government, seem to secure a remarkable 
balance of temperate adaptability that will allow the United States government to move 
forward through a changing world while always retaining levels of stability. This 
institutionalized tension, therefore, appears to give American democracy both a sense of 
vitality and a shot at longevity, which harkens back to Machiavelli’s statement that the 
stability and longevity of the Roman republic was a product of the tension existing 
between the Senate and the people, and that it was this that kept the republic free, and 
allowed it to avoid stagnancy and delay decay.  
The tangible presence and appreciation of tension in the American institutions of 
federalism and the separations of powers emphasize the more agonal aspects of American 
government. Agonists believe that the task of politics is to channel tension and conflict 
through institutions and processes that serve as “a political outlet within a pluralistic 
democratic system.”248 As the above paragraphs show, the institutions of federalism and 
the separation of powers do just that. Both federalism and the separation of powers 
doctrine carve out a place for contest and dissent within the apparatus of government. 
This, agonists like Mouffe argue, is “vital for a pluralist democracy.”249 Moreover, 
American institutions of government work to foster unity, but do so in contexts of 
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conflict and diversity.250 Compromises in American politics occur when facilitated 
through these institutions, but these compromises are simply “temporary respites in an 
ongoing confrontation,”251 an eternal confrontation that is acknowledged and sustained 
because it is regarded to be (at least) inevitable and (at most) beneficial for American 
Government. 
Party and Interest Group Politics 
American party and interest group politics also emphasize that the American 
polity features and respects tension within politics. Political parties and interest groups 
are at the center of American political processes, from elections, to law making. In 
Democracy in America, Tocqueville notes the seemingly perpetual tension between the 
various competing parties and interests groups that exist under American democratic 
pluralism. Tocqueville states, “In America, the liberty of association for political 
purposes is unlimited.”252 And his comments on the advantages of the contests that arise 
from pluralism in democracies, generally, which were explored in the previous chapter, 
clearly hold true when discussing American democracy, specifically.  
 In noting the vast number of political interests that vibrant pluralism produces in 
America, Tocqueville states,  “No sooner do you set foot upon American ground, than 
you are stunned by a kind of tumult; a confused clamor is heard on every side; and a 
thousand simultaneous voices demand the satisfaction of their social wants. Everything is 
in motion around you.”253 As described, the Americans seem to be the opposite of the 
“flock of timid and industrious animals” that the people would compose under “soft 
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despotism.”  Moreover, Tocqueville notes, “the unrestrained liberty of political 
association has not hitherto produced, in the United States, the fatal results, which might 
be expected.”254  
Undoubtedly, both the two-party system and interest group politics generally are 
marked by constant rivalry and discord. Partisan and interest group politics allow the 
multitude of interests that exist in American society to consolidate and be expressed with 
efficiency and strength. But they also provide a more formal setting, which allows the 
warring opinions of the American electorate to rage in a controlled fashion. To see this 
one only need look at national elections. Every four years, the American voting 
population divides into (typically) two groups, divided along party lines, which, as two 
scholars comment, “fight a word battle for control of the government.”255 Following this 
“war of opinion,”256 power is handed to the victor peacefully.  Therefore, parties and 
interest groups, as well as their contests, emphasize that there is tension between political 
ideas and policy preferences, but that this tension plays out in a systemized process; it is 
another example of the idea behind ‘ambition to counteract ambition.’ Thus, one can 
recognize party and interest group politics as an additional accommodation and 
appreciation of tension within American Government.  
Political Principles 
Having looked at formal, concrete institutions of American government, as well 
as party and interest group politics, I will now turn to identifying tension within a more 
abstract arena – American political principles. Louis Hartz states in his book, The Liberal 
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Tradition in America, “American political thought, as we have seen, is a veritable maze 
of polar contradictions, winding in and out of each other hopelessly.”257 Hartz identifies a 
number of competing principles. These include “pragmatism and absolutism, historicism, 
and rationalism, optimism and pessimism, materialism and idealism, individualism and 
conformism.”258 Hartz is not alone in recognizing the often contradictory nature of 
American political principles. Michael Kammen in The People of Paradox quotes Erik H. 
Erikson, a prominent psychoanalyst, who says, “it is a commonplace to state that 
whatever one may come to consider a truly American trait can be shown to have its 
equally characteristic opposite.”259  Kammen considers American domestic political 
values to be dualistic in nature. He states, “we are comfortable believing in both majority 
rule and minority rights, in both consensus and freedom, federalism and 
centralization…Americans have managed to be both puritanical and hedonistic, idealistic 
and materialistic, peace-loving and war-mongering, isolationist and interventionist, 
conformist and individualist, consensus-minded and conflict-prone.”260 But just as 
Kammen clarifies, Americans political culture does not just accommodate these polarities 
by adopting some sort of mean between them. Instead, as Kammen points out, “It may be 
perfectly reasonable to support majority rule with reservations, or minority rights with 
certain other reservations. But this has not been our method. Rather, we have tended to 
hold contradictory ideas in suspension.”261 I agree with the authors I’ve quoted above.  
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These tensions, and the resulting paradoxes that appear in American political 
thought, seem to be an actualization of something akin to Chantal Mouffe’s “democratic 
paradox,” discussed in the earlier chapter on agonism. The American form of political 
society is one whose precise “specificity comes from the articulation between”262 various 
pairings of distinct, sometimes opposing, traditions. I agree with both Mouffe and 
Tocqueville that one of the most obvious examples is the pairing of democratic equality 
and liberty within the American political tradition.  
Richard Hofstadter points out in The American Political Tradition that “modern 
American folklore assumes that democracy and liberty are all but identical, and when 
democratic writers take the trouble to make the distinction, they usually assume that 
democracy is necessary to liberty.”263 Both the principle of democracy and the principle 
of liberty are undoubtedly are at the backbone of American political thought, but as 
Tocqueville and Mouffe have indicated, democracy, which emphasizes equality, and 
liberty, which emphasizes freedom, are not the same and, in fact, often reside in contrast 
to one another.  
This tension between the political principles of equality and liberty manifests 
itself in many modern political debates. For instance, take campaign finance – Those who 
ascribe more value to the political principle of equality are inclined to see the negatives 
of big money and politics. They will point out that it biases the political process to favor 
the rich, allowing them to exert greater influence over elections and the political process. 
They will say it undermines true popular sovereignty and, therefore, democracy. On the 
other side, some favor the notion of liberty. These voices may expound the importance of 
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first amendment rights and of people’s freedom to put their resources (read: money) 
towards causes (read: candidates) as they wish. As such, to this day, the political 
principles of equality and liberty can lead Americans to vastly different policy positions, 
despite both values being integral to the other’s existence and at the core of American 
democracy.  
Other contradicting principles have similar effects, placing Americans on 
opposing sides of political debates. At times, this division may make the country slow to 
act. But, as Michael Kammen outlines, “our experience with polarities provides us with 
the potential for flexibility and diversity.”264 The dualistic nature of American political 
principles emphasizes how important tension and opposition are to American society. 
Tension transcends America’s political superstructures and can be found in the 
subterranean depths of American society in the dualistic principles and values that 
constitute the American psyche.  
Individual Statesmen and Citizens 
Additionally, while tension is evident in the American psyche in a broad, nation-
wide sense, tension can also appear in the psyche of individual Americans. Coats asserts 
in “A Theory of Republican Character” that republican character is characterized by an 
uneasy tension.  He states, “the distinctive characteristic of this personality is the attempt 
at a commonsensical balance between those extremes which are inescapable.”265 
Applying this idea to the American example, I assert that American character,266 as a 
specific form of republican character, is definitely distinguished by the presence of 
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tension. Moreover, I agree with Coats that the distinctive characteristic of Americans’ 
personality is their attempts at a balance between extremes which are unavoidable, 
although I doubt that the balance they procure will always be commonsensical. After all, 
as two writers observed, “it is characteristic of the American mind to hold contradictory 
ideas without bothering to resolve the conflicts between them.”267  
In the United States, as outlined above, tension is “institutionalized in a 
fundamental law”268 in political practices, and, moreover, is a distinguishing feature of 
American political thought. It’s hardly surprising, therefore, that tension characterizes 
American citizens. However, as Michael Kammen points out, “conflicts between 
Americans have been visible for a very long time, but most of us are just beginning to 
perceive the conflicts within us individually.”269  
First looking at average American citizens, a state of tension clearly marks their 
character. This state of tension emerges from their attempts to maintain “a healthy tension 
among the poles or dimensions of various intersecting axes,”270 for instance, between 
what one deems to be best for the “public good” and one’s own private interests. Ideally, 
these two are synonymous, but that may not always be the case. Additionally, tension 
may arise between the goal of self-reliance, or autonomy, and duty of being actively 
invested in politics and focused on community. A few more contradictions come to mind: 
American citizens are asked to honor tradition, but urge on progress; protect and promote 
their own beliefs, while never attacking anyone else’s. Michael Kammen outlines a few 
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other tensions that American individuals accommodate or feature. He names, “a large 
cluster of biformities,” including, “the conservative liberalism of our political life, the 
pragmatic idealism of our cerebral life, the emotional rationalism of our spiritual life, and 
godly materialism of our acquisitive life.”271  
“Moderate” citizens may be characterized by an even greater accommodation or 
appreciation of tension. Both David Brooks and former Senator Olympia Snowe, who 
write to summon the “silent majority” (i.e. moderates) to help mitigate political 
polarization and the ensuing gridlock (which will be discussed in this study’s 
conclusion), put forward an idea that proper moderates will be individual political actors 
who successfully accommodate, even internalize, political tension. Brooks and Snowe 
are, therefore, calling moderates to action because of their unique ability to accommodate 
the contentious disputes that divide our political system and facilitate a balance capable 
of overcoming political stagnation. 
  As was mentioned in the Introduction, in one of his “op-ed” pieces in the New 
York Times, entitled “What Moderation Means,” Brooks states, “in most great arguments, 
there are two partially true points of view, which sit in tension. The moderate tries to 
maintain a rough proportion between them, to keep her country along its historic 
trajectory.”272 Brooks’ moderate is impressive. His moderate is able to “preserve the 
tradition of conflict, keeping the opposing sides balanced.”273 The moderate can 
successfully maintain a balance among the many things that Brooks identifies, (as I 
have,) as lying in opposition within modern American democracy - equality vs. 
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achievement; centralization vs. decentralization; order and community vs. liberty and 
individualism; individual opportunity vs. social cohesion; local rights vs. federal power. 
Brooks goes on to clarify that “being moderate does not mean being tepid…The best 
moderates can smash partisan categories and be hard-charging in two directions 
simultaneously.”274 Certainly this marks an agonistic conception of moderation. Olympia 
Snowe puts forth a similar description of an ideal “moderate” in her book Fighting for 
Common Ground.  Snowe, who extensively quotes Brooks in her chapter on moderation, 
adds that “moderates” have a “willingness to live with a compromise, even if it includes 
policies they disagree with, if it facilitates the passage of legislation that ultimately will 
move the country forward.”275 It is the moderate’s responsibility, therefore, to bridge the 
gap between policies, and to accommodate the tensions that exist between them. 
Moreover, there is historical precedent for this sort of agonistic moderation. As explained 
by Hofstadter, the Founding Fathers had an image of themselves as “moderate 
republicans, standing between political extremes.”276 
Having mentioned the Founding Fathers, the first American statesmen, it is 
important to note that it is perhaps American statesmen who are the individuals most 
characterized by tension in the United States. To clarify, I am using the term “statesmen” 
to simply describe preeminent politicians or public officials. American statesmen must 
balance the polarities and paradoxes that citizens confront, albeit they must balance these 
to a different, perhaps greater, extent.  Instead of merely balancing the “public good” 
with their own private interests, they are asked to balance the warring private interests of 
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others to somehow secure the greatest amount of possible good for the public. American 
statesman must also, like Brooks’ and Snowe’s “moderates,” find a way to facilitate 
equilibrium or compromise between adverse policy positions and to transform politics 
and debate into policy and action.  
Additionally, statesmen must embrace and exhibit qualities that often are 
paradoxical or contradictory. As Michael Kammen states in People of Paradox, 
“Americans expect their heroes to be Everyman and Superman simultaneously.”277 
Kammen also outlines that American heroes, which I’ll deem to include those whom I’m 
calling statesmen, must be virtuous, but also capable of necessary evil. “The 
quintessential American hero wears both a halo and horns.”278 In this vein, the American 
statesman may be called to evoke some Machiavellian characteristics; they need be both 
fox and lion, both feared and loved.  
Thomas Cronin and Michael Genovese’s comments in The Paradoxes of the 
American Presidency also emphasize the contradictions and tensions, which characterize 
the qualities of American statesmanship. (Admittedly, I’m assuming that American 
presidents qualify as American statesmen and that Cronin and Genovese’s words on 
presidents can be applied to statesmen more broadly).  Cronin and Genovese describe the 
American presidency as a “complex, multidimensional, even contradictory institution.”279 
But they also assert that it is essential to American government. Most basically, they 
understand the presidency “as a series of paradoxes, clashing expectations, and 
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contradictions.”280 As I’ve stated above, I believe these comments can be extended to the 
broader category of American statesmen, rather than just presidents. To turn again to the 
words of Cronin and Genovese,  
In the United States, “leaders live with contradictions 
…Leadership situations commonly require successive 
displays of contrary or divergent forces. Living with, even 
embracing, contradictions is a sign of political and personal 
maturity. The effective leader understands the presence of 
opposites. The aware leader, much like a first-rate 
conductor, knows when to bring in various sections, knows 
when and how to turn the volume up and down, and learns 
how to balance opposing sections to achieve desired 
results.”281  
 
Moreover, statesmen must embody characteristics that appear at ends to gain the trust, 
and the votes, of the American people. The need to embody contradictory qualities is 
surely facilitated by pluralism. The multiplicity of opinions and interests present in the 
United States makes for equally abundant and diverse expectations of our leaders. For 
instance, Cronin and Genovese outline nine paradoxes that statesmen, presidents 
specifically, must incorporate in their public personhood. They are as follows:  
First, they are to be powerful and effective, capable of solving the nation's most 
critical dilemmas, yet are to be limited by law and unable to infringe on individual liberty 
or to become a tyrant. Second, they must exhibit democratic, average, behavior, while 
still being uncommonly heroic. This reckons back to the quote by Michael Kammen cited 
earlier that American heroes must be “Everyman and Superman simultaneously.”282 
Third, they must be empathetic and compassionate at times, but at other times ruthless 
and tough. Fourth, they must appear above petty politics, yet be able to successfully 
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navigate the political, and partisan, system, which they head. The fifth, similar to the 
fourth, they are to be a unifying force, while also serving as head of their political party 
and advocating for its policies. Sixth, they are to be idealistic and to operate in universals, 
yet pragmatic and programmatic. Seventh, they must be confident, but certainly not 
arrogant; they must be self-assured, yet humble. Eighth, the qualities needed to get 
elected and those needed to govern may, in fact, be different. The ninth and final paradox 
presented by Cronin and Genovese calls back to the first – it is the idea that they must be 
at times strong, at others weak; preferably, they will appear to be both.  
Having fleshed through all of Cronin and Genovese’s paradoxes and discussed the 
other tensions that statesmen must accommodate, one can truly appreciate how sustained 
tensions characterize American statesmen. In A Theory of Republican Character, Coats 
says of his “republican character,” “on this reading, then, the human condition is a 
manageable tension at its best, susceptible to only intermittent moments of resolution.”283 
The above paragraphs emphasize that this thought accurately describes the character of 
American citizens, and moderates and statesmen in particular. As Kammen states in 
People of Paradox, “in the United States, the human condition – which is everywhere 
paradoxical to be sure – has been given unusual freedom to vacillate permissively 
between possible poles.”284 This understanding emphasizes that the paradoxical character 
of American citizens and statesmen is a manifestation of the larger theme of tension and 
conflict that is woven throughout the American Polity. 
Having explored how and where tension appears in the United States’ 
countervailing institutions of federalism and the separation of powers, in its vibrant 
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partisan and interest group politics, in its dualistic political principles, and in the 
paradoxical character of its citizens and statesmen, it is not difficult to understand 
statements like that made by Italian author Raoul Romoli-Venturi, who Kammen quotes 
as saying, “all the tensions of the world have been imported by the United States.”285 
Tension is an essential element of democracy in America. Understanding this is generally 
useful as it allows one to begin to “tie together all the themes and facts in American 
Government,”286 which may often seem inconsistent and paradoxical. But it is especially 
helpful for this study, as it emphasizes that the American experiment in democracy 
features agonistic qualities. 
First, American democracy can be identified as agonistic in that it embraces 
pluralism as inevitable and accepts that tension, discord, conflict, and paradox will arise 
from pluralism. Moreover, the American polity espouses this tension, treating it as 
necessary, even positive, for the maintenance of democracy. To again borrow words from 
Coats, the stability of the American mixed republic “resides in the equilibrium between 
opposing forces – between dependence and independence, order and liberty, energy and 
stability, ambition and ambition, duty and interest, branches of government, the militia 
and the regular army, principles of proportional and equal representation, commerce and 
agriculture, differing commercial interests, religious denominations, and so on.”287 While 
this study has only addressed a few of the opposing forces listed above, the examples it 
has explored emphasize that tension is by no means treated as negative in the American 
case; American democracy does not eschew tension. Rather, as this chapter has shown, 
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the American system institutionalizes tension, conflict, and contradiction in its 
establishments, traditions, principles, and people. 
The notion of institutionalizing tension reinforces the identification of the 
American experiment in democracy as notably agonistic. In his book Institutionalizing 
Agonistic Democracy, Ed Wingenbach states, “agonistic democrats embrace the need for 
a political order within which conflict can occur in a sustainable and contingently 
legitimated fashion.”288 He juxtaposes this with other radical democrats, who denounce 
the political utility of formal institutions. Agonal theory accepts and appreciates tension, 
but only to the extent that it can exist within the confines of an established system. 
Agonal theory believes that tension can be beneficial when it is institutionalized because 
it can then “transform as much as possible the violence engendered by either anarchy or 
exclusion into forces that productively inform democratic decision-making.”289 The 
Founding Fathers, as Richard Hofstadter points out, saw democracy as a transitional stage 
of government.290 They believed it was apt to evolve into either anarchy or tyranny. They 
designed the American mixed regime, therefore, to channel the energies, which could 
lead the country towards anarchy or tyranny, into the democratic process instead, giving 
it a stable, yet raw, energetic vitality. As a result, and as this chapter has exposed, 
conflict, opposition, and paradox are tangible throughout the American polity to this very 
day.  
A final point helps to reaffirm American democracy as agonistic. Consensus can, 
and must, exist in America. Moreover, although recent events suggest otherwise, 
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generally it is sought after in America, especially in times of crisis. However, consensus 
is acknowledged to be temporary and fleeting. Consensus may be reached on one 
provision of one piece of legislation, on one broader policy, on one aspect of the 
relationship between the branches, on the existence of one political principle, or on one 
idea that is judged to be in the interest of the “common good”. But consensus is never 
universal or permanent.  Moreover, consensus is not the ultimate goal of all American 
politics. Rather, consensus is simply momentary agreement or compromise that results 
from the process of politics. The ultimate goal of politics would seem then to be more 
politics, because the continuation of political activity represents the survival of the 
political system and of democracy as well.  
The preceding three paragraphs explain the claim made in the introduction to this 
chapter that the American experiment in democracy is, more specifically, an experiment 
in agonistic democracy. This fact makes a good deal of sense when one considers that the 
Founding Fathers, and the nation they fashioned, were greatly influenced by the thinkers 
discussed in the second chapter. Therefore, having concluded by restating the claim that 
this chapter sought to defend, I’ll close this chapter with the words of one of the writers 
that greatly informed this chapter of my study, Michael Kammen, who provides a 
beautiful description of the agonal quality of American democracy: “America historically 
has achieved the ultimate stability of an arch: those very forces which are logically 
calculated to drag stones to the ground actually provides props of support – derived from 
a principle in which thrust and counter-thrust become means of counterpoise.”291  
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CONCLUSION 
The State of Disunion292 
 
“Every difference of opinion is not a difference of 
principle. We have called by different names brethren of 
the same principle. We are all Republicans. We are all 
Federalists.” 
–Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address 
 
 For two centuries in the United States of America, tension appears to have 
accomplished that which Machiavelli, Mouffe, and others believe it is capable of. Over 
its 239-year lifespan, the American republic has been marked by vitality, stability, and 
has had a sense that it would outlast time, with one notable exception – the Civil War. 
During the Civil War, the tensions, conflicts, and paradoxes that characterize the United 
States’ government, principles, and people, morphed from what Mouffe deems agonistic 
into what she deems antagonistic; in other words, tensions shifted from being struggles or 
competitions between opponents to being, quite literally, violent fights between mortal 
enemies. Herein, rather than providing the United States with vitality and stability, 
tension threatened to tear the republic apart. That moment of history prompts one to 
harken back to Machiavelli’s warning that, although tension provides vitality and 
longevity, it also will eventually destroy a republic.   
The Civil War, when tensions threatened to destroy the republic, marked the first 
time that the United States experienced a full on confrontation of the problem of 
maintaining the stability of its ideas and institutions. The Civil War, therefore, constituted 
what J.G.A Pocock calls a “Machiavellian Moment.” This signifies a moment in the life 
of a republic when it realizes that it too is mortal. Pocock describes a “Machiavellian 
Moment” as “the moment in conceptualized time in which the republic was seen as 
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confronting its own temporal finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically 
stable in a stream of irrational events conceived as essentially destructive of all systems 
of secular stability.”293 The Civil War certainly brought the United States to its knees and 
forced it to recognize its own mortality. This is evident in what are, perhaps, the most 
famous words of this era – the words of the Gettysburg Address. In the Gettysburg 
Address, Lincoln stated that the great task before the United states was to experience “a 
new birth of freedom” to ensure “that government of the people, by the people, for the 
people, shall not perish from the earth.”294 This implies a recognition that “government of 
the people, by the people, for the people,” i.e. American democracy, was deemed to be at 
risk of perishing. Herein, the Civil War, the moment in United States history when 
tension escalated to a point where it threatened to destroy the republic, constituted 
America’s first “Machiavellian Moment.” The question is whether we’re approaching 
another. 
In the years following the Civil War, particularly in the wake of both World Wars, 
the United States seemed to have forgotten, or at least ignored, its mortality once more. 
For the larger part of the twentieth century, American democracy appeared to consider 
itself almost timeless, protected by Providence, and even, at the most extreme, to be a 
millennialist realization. However, today such an outlook does not seem to be 
overwhelmingly, or obviously, apparent. I do not mean to imply that America fully 
accepts, much less understands, its own mortality. But if one were to naively ask a 
roomful of my peers whether they believed the United States was immortal, they would 
likely hear a chorus of “No’s” or, at least, an ominous silence. Our own mortality, as a 
                                                        
293 Pocock, viii 
294 Lincoln, Abraham. “The Gettysburg Address.” The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln. Eds. John G. 
Nicolay and John Hay. New York: Tany-Thomas Co., 1905  
  97 
nation, does not seem to be staring us in the face as it did during the Civil War, but it 
does seem to be lurking in the shadows of this American life.  
There appears to be a notable concern for the current state, and the future, of the 
American republic. And at the core of this concern is a worry over the current nature of 
the tension ingrained in American political society. In other words, there is concern about 
the state of our agonistic democracy. Has the nature of the tension central to the 
American republic changed? And if so how?  
I believe that at the hand of polarization, the nature of the tension within the 
American polity is changing. Presently, American politics are housed in the extremes. 
This means that the tensions that lay at the heart of political society in the United States 
have become more pronounced. As I see it, polarization takes agonal politics – 
characterized by conflict and dissension between adversaries – and turns them into an 
antagonistic politics, in which others are now enemies. Why is this? There have always 
been divisions within the United States. What about today’s modern polarized climate 
makes them so stark? 
My suggestion is that perhaps the political phenomenon of polarization signifies a 
broader trend, a trend in which Americans no longer universally honor the same 
principles or ends of government. It has been observed that for the majority of United 
States history – the Civil War era excluded – American citizens, and their statesmen, 
venerated a single set of principles, along with institutions that functioned for these 
principles. As discussed in the last chapter, some of the principles contradict each other. 
Nonetheless, it appeared as though the majority of the American populace believed in and 
accommodated all these principles, and willingly navigated and negotiated their 
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paradoxes. Dissension and debate, therefore, centered around which policies would best 
bring about the realization of these universal principles.  American politics was Mouffe’s 
‘conflictual consensus’ come to life; there was a general agreement on what ‘ethico-
political principles’ were – say liberty and equality – but disagreement “concerning the 
meaning and implementation of those principles.”295  Moreover, there was a sense that 
opposition was legitimate, and a willingness to continue forward with the opposition in a 
mutual struggle. Now, however, it seems that one side of the populace favors one set of 
principles and the other favors another. Dissension and debate have, therefore, become 
centered on advocating for one set of principles, while discrediting the other. Moreover, 
there is a pervasive sense that opposition is illegitimate, and sometimes not worthy 
enough to engage with.   
Thomas Jefferson remarked in his First Inaugural Address, “every difference of 
opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the 
same principle. We are all Republicans. We are all Federalists.”296 It seems that the 
sentiment behind this statement is beginning to hold true no longer. Rather than a state of 
union characterized by conflict, dissension, and the maintenance of a reasonable tension, 
which provides activity, vitality, and a continuation of a mutual struggle among 
competing values and interests, the United States seems to be in a state of disunion, 
characterized by the development of an obstinate rift that produces stagnation, 
enervation, and a refusal to engage with opposition. It is a reasonable concern, therefore, 
that (as Machiavelli warned) the tensions which once made us stable and provided 
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vitality and longevity, could be undermining our republic and slowly leading it towards 
its second “Machiavellian Moment.”  
The underlying goal of this study, therefore, was to explore the contemporary 
theory of agonism, and preceding appreciations of political tension, in the hopes of better 
understanding the American polity and its current ailments. Perhaps this goal stems from 
the idea that you must diagnose and unravel problems before you can fix them. A 
thorough examination of agonal theory and previous moments of, and opposition to, 
agonistic ideas allows one to understand when political conflict can procure political 
health and when it cannot. It leads one to the conclusion that, so long as the United States 
remains in an internal, quasi-“cold-war” over what its political principles truly are, it will 
struggle to move forward through history, it will lack energy and vitality, and its 
longevity will be threatened. For political tension to once more produce positive effects, 
it must shift back from being antagonistic in nature, to being agonistic. This, I believe, 
can be accomplished. Therefore, while this study opened with a melancholy statement, it 
will close with an optimistic one – Political tension can once again provide political 
health when we, as a nation, recommit, at some general level, to be “brethren of the same 
principle.”  
Surely, such a recommitment will take a significant push, perhaps one engendered 
by the nation as a whole. Claiming to know how to initiate or execute such a push would 
be naïve. Perhaps, however, it starts by asking questions that ask us to look at the big 
picture, to step back from the strictly practical and particular, to self-reflect, to face the 
abstract and the long-range, and to think deeply. In other words, perhaps by turning to 
questions of theory, we may begin to mend our practical maladies.  
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